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COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS OF TAKEOVER
REGULATION
DEBORAH A. DEMOT*
Systems of corporate law and securities regulation differ considerably
among jurisdictions. This Article focuses on differences among the rules
that pertain to corporate takeovers. No jurisdiction's regulation of
tender offers, however complex its terms, operates in a legal or economic
vacuum. Thus, this Article begins by examining the institutional and
economic factors that define the regulatory and transactional climate for
tender offer regulation. These factors, in large part, explain why hostile
takeover transactions occur in significant numbers in only relatively few
countries. Section II surveys information describing the takeover envi-
ronment in four of those countries-the United States, Great Britain,
Canada and Australia. Section III considers the legal context in which
takeover regulation is embedded in these countries and the restraints the
legal system imposes on bidders and target management. The discussion
then narrows to a comparison of the rules of these systems that pertain to
specific issues in tender offer regulation. The Article concludes by con-
sidering the larger question of whether specific impacts on transactional
activity can be traced to particular aspects of these regulatory systems.1
I. INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS
Comparative writing about legal rules carries risks, including the pos-
sibility of overemphasizing the differences among jurisdictions' formal
legal rules at the expense of adequate attention to their similarities as
well as inadequate attention to other less specifically "legal" aspects of
the systems under comparison which may complement, if not always ex-
plain, some of the legal dissimilarities. The structure of the stock ex-
changes in each system and the regulatory function of these exchanges is
of particular importance to understanding the institutional and economic
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful to Robert Austin, John C.
Coffee, Jr. and Douglas Ginsburg for their comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. A
slightly different version of this Article appears in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT
OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman eds. 1987).
1. On each of these matters, in the interests of clarity, the Article first presents material for the
United States, followed by Britain, Canada and Australia, almost always in that order.
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context of corporate takeovers. Patterns of corporate ownership and
control, in effect the demographics of shareholding, are of equal
importance.
A. Stock Exchanges
In the United States, there are several stock exchanges and an organ-
ized system for over-the-counter trading in securities. All are regulated
by the federal Securities and Exchange Commission. Among the ex-
changes, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) dominates with the
largest number and highest market value of securities, listing about four
times the number and about twenty times the market value of securities
on the second leading exchange-the American Stock Exchange.2 Stock
exchanges in the United States operate autonomously, not jointly, and do
not impose uniform standards for listing. Traditionally, the nation's
largest companies have been listed on the NYSE. That fact, coupled
with the NYSE's more exacting requirements for listing, has lent some
cachet to an issuer's listing on that exchange.
The NYSE's listing requirements have often functioned as an impor-
tant supplement to legally imposed requirements for corporate practice
and operation. For example, the exchange has long required corpora-
tions to have audit and nominating committees composed of independent
directors. Although practice recently has varied, by declining to list non-
voting common shares (and voting shares of issuers with non-voting
common shares) and common shares with differential voting rights, the
NYSE has significantly inhibited the issuance of such securities by the
most visible corporate constituency in the United States.
Britain, in contrast, has one stock exchange-the London Stock Ex-
change. Although under its guidance a limited over-the-counter market
has developed in the last few years, most companies seek a listing on the
Stock Exchange if they propose to issue shares to the public. The listing
requirements for the Stock Exchange, interpreted and enforced by its
Quotations Department, traditionally have demanded more disclosure by
corporate issuers subject to them than do the Companies Acts.' Most
2. 1980 SEC. ANN. REP. 128. In 1985, the American Stock Exchange listed 936 issues and the
New York Stock Exchange listed 2,332. See Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1986, at 9B, 16B. In dollar value of
recent trading volume, the Pacific Stock Exchange outranks the American, however. See THE To-
RONTO STOCK EXCHANGE, 1985 FACT BOOK 53.
3. The problem of inconsistent but parallel disclosure requirements was resolved in part in
1985 when the Stock Exchange adopted directives implementing EEC Directives intended to harmo.
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significant, however, is the London Stock Exchange's participation in the
Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, the self-regulatory body in Britain
that administers and periodically revises the City Code on Take-overs
and Mergers. The London Stock Exchange, the Bank of England, and
other British financial institutions created the Panel in 1968 to deal with
perceived abuses in corporate takeovers. Sanctions for violations of the
Code are extra-legal and include, potentially, de-listing of securities by
the London Stock Exchange and denial of the use of all British brokerage
house facilities.
Canada, like the United States, has several stock exchanges.4 Cana-
dian stock exchanges are regulated by the provinces in which they are
situated. The Canadian constitution, unlike that of the United States,
does not confer on the national government plenary power to regulate
interprovincial commerce. Thus, although Canada has a national corpo-
rations statute, securities regulation-and more specifically the regula-
tion of stock exchanges-is a provincial matter. Further, the provinces
have not enacted uniform legislation. Nonetheless, the Toronto Stock
Exchange dominates the field in the number and perceived quality of
securities listed,5 an institutional fact that gives Ontario a bellwether po-
sition in securities regulation. Like exchanges in the United States, Ca-
nadian stock exchanges operate autonomously and have no common set
of requirements for listing. In contrast to the United States, there is little
over-the-counter trading in Canada.
In Australia, each of the six capital cities6 has a stock exchange. All
are members of the Australian Associated Stock Exchanges Ltd. (the
AASE), as are some country Exchanges. At present, Melbourne and
Sydney operate almost as one exchange, and all the exchanges' listing
nize member states' law and practices for listing securities on stock exchanges. The effect of the
regulations is to suspend the prospectus requirements of the Companies Act, 1985 for listed compa-
nies. See I A. BOYLE & R. SYKES, GORE-BROWNE ON COMPANIES § 10.1 (44th ed. 1986).
4. The Canadian exchanges are the Alberta Stock Exchange (in Calgary), the Montreal Ex-
change, the Toronto Stock Exchange, the Vancouver Stock Exchange, and the Winnipeg Stock Ex-
change. Toronto also has a separate futures exchange.
5. As of June 1985, the Toronto Stock Exchange accounted for 76.8% of the total dollar value
of shares traded in Canada. Montreal is in a distant second place with 18.7%. See TSE FACT
BOOK, supra note 2, at 52. By June 1985, 939 companies and 1,402 issues of securities were listed on
the Toronto Stock Exchange, id. at 18, and 121 Canadian-based issues were listed both in Toronto
and on an exchange in the United States, id. at 53.
6. The capital cities (and their states) are Melbourne (Victoria), Sydney (New South Wales),
Brisbane (Queensland), Adelaide (South Australia), Perth (Western Australia) and Hobart (Tasma-
nia). Sydney has a separate futures exchange.
1987]
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agreements are virtually uniform.7 The AASE, as noted below, has itself
played a substantial regulatory role in connection with corporate take-
overs. As in Canada, for constitutional reasons, aspects of corporate law
and securities regulation are prerogatives of the six Australian states; 8
unlike Canada, Australia now has uniform companies and securities
codes as a result of a compact among the states to follow the lead estab-
lished by federal statutes in these areas. As in the United States, Austra-
lian administrative responsibility for the enforcement of securities
legislation is lodged with a federal commission-the National Companies
and Securities Commission (the NCSC). A separate body, the Ministe-
rial Council, composed of the States' attorneys general has policy-making
and general supervisory functions.9 There is no developed over-the-
counter market in Australia.
Even the simplest comparison of the institutions described above sug-
gests that they differ significantly in their regulatory capacities. The
Stock Exchange in London, alone and through the Panel on Take-Overs
and Mergers, and the AASE in Australia have achieved uniform listing
standards and other rules for the corporate issuers under their aegis. As
described in detail below, they operate as significant regulatory forces in
defining acceptable conduct in corporate takeovers. In contrast, stock
exchanges in Canada and the United States do not speak with one voice.
Although one exchange in each country is dominant, and imposes major
constraints on its constituency of issuers through its listing requirements,
these nations' exchanges, as groups, appear to play a less forceful regula-
tory role on issues relevant to takeovers than do the AASE and the
London Stock Exchange. In addition, the vigor and depth of over-the-
7. See R. BAXT, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPANY LAW 328 (1982).
8. See generally Howard, The Corporations Power in the Australian Constitution, in THE COR-
PORATION AND AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY 12 (K. Lingren, H. Mason & B. Gordon eds. 1974).
9. The creation of a national body with substantial regulatory capacity over corporate matters
was a political achievement requiring considerable finesse to negotiate and subtlety to execute. See
Santow, US. Participation in Australian Financial Services and Securities Markets, in LEGAL As-
PECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH AUSTRALIA 67-68 (E. Solomon, M. Brown & R. Chambers eds.
1984). Some of the Australian states' traditional mistrust of organs of national government was
reduced by the compact structure, which permits any state to exit from the scheme by repealing its
legislation to make the federal legislation applicable in that state. Further, all states have equal
representation on the Ministerial Council, arguably reducing potential domination by the Common-
wealth government. Finally, although the NCSC is situated in Melbourne, the Ministerial Council
has its office in Sydney. The fact that neither is in Canberra, Australia's national capital, evidences
the pervasive Australian concern with national influence. For a general discussion of Australian's
distrust of Canberra and its basis in Australian history, see Albinski, Australia and the United States,
DAEDALUS 395 (Winter 1985).
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counter trading in the United States means that issuers who seek to raise
public capital do not necessarily need to list their securities on an ex-
change."0 This institutional fact also decreases the exchanges' regulatory
potential in the United States.
B. Patterns of Corporate Ownership and Control
The type of takeover bid that elicits the most popular and professional
interest is, of course, the hostile offer, a bid unwelcomed by the target's
management. In contrast, "friendly" bids can be seen as negotiated cor-
porate acquisitions or amalgamations excecuted through the technique of
an offer made directly to a corporation's shareholders. Whether hostile
bids are feasible in any country is in large part a function of patterns of
share ownership in that country, of shareholders' ability to transfer their
shares freely, and of the voting rights allocated to publicly held shares.
In the United States, financial institutions hold a substantial percent-
age of the shares of the largest publicly traded companies.11 Relatively
few large, publicly traded companies, on the other hand, have one share-
holder who owns more than fifty percent of the shares, which amounts to
legal control. Even though more large companies have shareowners
whose holdings are large enough to give them effective control, these
amount to less than one-sixth of all large companies. 12 Thus, although
10. In 1984, NASDAQ share volume was two-thirds of the share volume of the NYSE and
nearly 10 times the Amex volume. NASDAQ 1984 FACT BOOK 11 (1985). NASDAQ's dollar
volume in 1984 was $153.5 billion; indeed, it is the third largest market in the world in terms of
dollar value of trading. Id. at 106. Four thousand seven hundred twenty-three securities were en-
tered in the NASDAQ system, id. at 10, which through computer technology enables national trad-
ing in the securities included. Although NASDAQ sets criteria for inclusion in its system, see id. at
16, its criteria concern such matters as the company's assets and public float and do not include the
"regulatory" aspects of a listing agreement with a stock exchange.
11. By the end of 1980, major institutional investors accounted for 35.4% of all NYSE stock.
See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1983 FACT BOOK 52.
12. The following breakdown was derived, as of February 1983, from the Standard & Poor's
Index:
Number of Percentage of
Compames Companies
Shareholder with legal control (50% or more) 6 1.2
Shareholder with effective control (20%-49.9%) 68 13.16
Widely held shares 426 85.2
Total 500 100%
See REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY COMMITTEE ON TAKE-OVER BIDS, THE REGULATION
OF TAKE-OVER BIDS IN CANADA: PREMIUM PRIVATE AGREEMENT TRANSACTIONS 75 n.89 (Nov.
1983) [hereinafter SECURITIES INDUSTRY COMMITTEE REPORT].
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ownership of large corporations may be significantly institutional, it is
significantly diffuse as well. Further, the norm in public companies in
the United States is free transferability of shares. This norm is reinforced
by the NYSE's refusal to list shares that are not freely transferable. Only
that Exchange and the Pacific Stock Exchange, however, decline to list
shares with restricted or differential voting rights.
Patterns of shareownership in large Canadian companies are strikingly
different. Unlike publicly traded companies in the United States, a ma-
jority of large, publicly traded Canadian corporations are legally or effec-
tively controlled by an identifiable shareholder or group of
shareholders."3 In Canada, the aggregate concentration (i.e., percentage
of economic activity accounted for by the largest firms) is currently
higher than in the United States, although this concentration in Canada
has decreased from levels earlier in this century.14 Indeed, economic
power in Canada appears to be concentrated in a few family-controlled
groups. In 1985, for example, nine families were reported to control
forty-six percent of the top 300 companies traded on the Toronto Stock
Exchange.15 This fact personalizes the concentration of corporate control
in a striking fashion. In contrast with the NYSE, the Toronto Stock
Exchange permits issuers to have common shares with restricted or dif-
ferential voting rights; 6 the Toronto exchange also appears to list shares
of companies with bylaws restricting the transfer of shares, beyond stated
percentages, to non-residents of Canada.17
13. Id. at 3. The following breakdown was derived from the companies with shares included in
the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Composite Index:
Number of Percentage of
Compani'e Companies
Shareholder with legal control (50% or more) 137 48.4
Shareholder with effective control (20%-49.9%) 85 30.0
Widely held shares 61 21.6
Total 283 100%
Id. at 69 n.9.
14. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CORPORATE CONCENTRATION 11-12 (1978)
[hereinafter CANADIAN CONCENTRATION REPORT].
15. See Taking Aim at Takeovers, MacLean's, April 29, 1985, at 36.
16. See The Toronto Exchange Policies, Policy Statement on Restricted Shares, 4 CAN. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) q 815-422 (1984). The Exchange recommends that a company with non-voting or
restricted-voting common shares make provision for such shares to participate, on a "fair" basis, in
any premium offered for the shares with superior rights. The inclusion of such protective provisions
has become standard practice since 1981 in Canadian underwritings. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 12, at 32.
17. The TSE's listing requirements do not exclude the use of such qualifications for share own-
[Vol. 65:69
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In Britain, financial institutions dominate as shareowners of publicly
traded companies to an even greater extent than in the United States. 8
While the London Exchange will list non-voting shares, provided they
are so designated, 19 fully paid-up shares must be freely transferable.2"
Finally, although the British economy seems more concentrated than
that of the United States,2 ' large British companies, unlike their Cana-
dian counterparts, are not controlled by a small number of identifiable
family groups.
Shareholdings in Australia are also dominated by institutions, espe-
cially life insurance companies. Of course, the dollar volume of trading
on Australian exchanges is much smaller than that on exchanges in the
United States. While the estimated volume for the NYSE might be $3.5
billion in one typical day, the comparable volume on all exchanges in
Australia would be $40 million.2 2
Once again, however, one should not overemphasize the importance of
the differences among these countries. They share one trait of super-
vening importance for the purpose of this Article: all have active mar-
kets in which hostile as well as negotiated corporate acquisitions occur
frequently. The question that immediately comes to mind is why such
transactions, particularly hostile transactions, do not occur with
equivalent frequency in any number of other market-economy countries
with active public trading in securities. The hostile corporate transaction
is, indeed, virtually a non-event in many countries that otherwise are
similar to those discussed in this Article. For example; countries on the
European continent and Japan23 appear to have few if any hostile corpo-
ership, and their use in large Canadian companies has been reported. For example, in 1976 the
Canadian company Brascan adopted, at its management's urging, a bylaw prohibiting foreign inter-
ests from owning more than 49% of Brascan's shares. The company's institutional investors be-
lieved the change lowered the price of their shares and perceived it as a management device to
perpetuate its control. See Brown, How Jake Moore Lost Brascan, CAN. Bus. Nov. 1979, at 131.
18. In 1975, institutions owned 46.8% of all shares listed on the London Stock Exchange. See
M. Blume, The Financial Markets, in BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1980). More recent
estimates set the percentage at a higher point.
19. See THE STOCK EXCHANGE, ADMISSION OF SECURITIES TO LISTING, § 9, ch. 1, para. II.
20. See id., at § 9, ch. 1, para. I.
21. See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PRICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, A REVIEW OF Mo-
NOPOLIES AND MERGER POLICY: A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT 9 (1978).
22. See Santow, supra note 9, at 63. At present, about 32% of shares are held in the name of
persons, whereas in the early 1950's 75% of shares were held by persons. Id. Trading volume on the
Australian exchanges is less than comparable volumes on the Toronto and London and New York
exchanges.
23. A rare exception was the $1.4 billion bid made in 1985 by Trafalgar Holdings and a British
19871
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rate takeovers.
Explaining why events do not happen tends to be more interesting
than explaining why events do happen, but it also tends to be more diffi-
cult, especially where, as with the non-occurrence of hostile takeovers in
some countries, many different explanations are plausible. Nonetheless,
it is useful to isolate two features of shareownership patterns that are
essential to the development of an active market for corporate acquisi-
tions, including hostile acquisitions: 1) shareholders' ability to transfer
shares free of restraints within the unilateral control of the company's
management, and 2) public ownership of shares holding voting rights
sufficient to constitute legal control. In countries in which hostile acqui-
sitions do not occur, one or both of these elements appears to be missing.
L Share Transferability
As noted above, stock exchange listing requirements in the United
States and Great Britain preclude the use of restrictions on share trans-
ferability in publicly traded companies. Indeed, in both countries the
restriction on share transfer is typically characterized as an earmark of a
private company.24 In other systems, however, restrictions on share
transferability are not similarly confined by law or practice to closely
held enterprises. Canadian corporation statutes, for example, permit
public offerings of shares that restrict transfer to non-Canadian residents
partner for Minebea, a manufacturing conglomerate in Japan. The bid, reportedly the first hostile
offer for a Japanese firm made by foreign interests, ended in April 1986 when the offerors sold the
shares they had acquired in Minebea. After the offer was announced, Minebea announced that it
would merge with another Japanese company on terms that would give it control over 30 million
shares of its own stock and would increase to 53% the shares in safe hands unlikely to tender. The
offer for Minebea also met with opposition from Japan's Ministry of Finance and other agencies. See
N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1986, at 19, col. 1.
24. Changes in the provisions of the English Companies Acts touching on these sorts of restric-
tions occurred as a result of the United Kingdom's adoption in 1980 of legislation to implement the
Second Directive on Company Law adopted by the EEC's Council of Ministers in 1976. See Euro-
pean Report, Jan. 23, 1985, at 2. Under the 1980 legislation, consistent with the Second Directive,
the "private company" became the residual form of corporate organization in Britain and the "pub-
lic company" form became available only for those firms meeting the qualifications prescribed by the
statute, including a fixed amount of minimum capital and a requirement that one quarter of the
shares be paid up. Prior to the 1980 legislation, in Britain the public company was the residual form
and the private company, like its American counterpart under some statutes-the "close corpora-
tion,"-was a classification applicable only to those corporations meeting specific tests set forth in
the statute. In particular, § 28 of the Companies Act, 1948 required that the would-be private com-
pany's articles include some restriction on the transferability of its shares. The obligation to include
restraints on share transfer to qualify as a "private company" was eliminated by the 1980 legislation.
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when the company needs, for licensing purposes, to maintain a stated
percentage of ownership by Canadians. 25 In some instances these stat-
utes permit public offerings when the shares are subject to even broader
transfer prohibitions.16 Even though Canada obviously has an active cor-
porate acquisitions market, because its economy historically has at-
tracted substantial amounts of foreign capital investment,2 7 imposing a
Canadian residency requirement on some share transfers may in fact pre-
clude some hostile takeovers that would otherwise occur.
Broad restrictions on share transferability are permitted by corporate
statutes in continental Europe, even in publicly held companies. For ex-
ample, in France the provisions of the Code des Socidtds concerning the
Socidtd Anonyme, the business corporation in France most similar to the
American corporation, permit the corporation's articles to require that
transfers to "a third party whomever he may be" be subject to the corpo-
ration's consent.2" If the corporation does not consent to the transfer, it
may, with the seller's consent, repurchase the shares itself or cause the
shares to be purchased by a shareholder or a third party. 29 Even more
draconian restraints on transfer are permissible under Swiss corporate
law. Swiss law permits a corporation's articles to prohibit any transfer of
25. See, e.g., Ontario Business Corporations Act § 42(2), Ont. Stat. (Ch. 4 1982).
26. See Canada Business Corporations Act § 168(1), III Can. Stat. (Ch. 115 1982) (permitting
shares offered to public to be subject only to restraints against transfer to non-Canadian residents
and to restraints necessary for company to qualify under Canadian law to engage in particular busi-
ness activities).
27. See CANADIAN CONCENTRATION REPORT, supra note 14, at 4 (observing that Canadian
industry has a higher proportion of foreign ownership than any other developed economy).
28. Code des Soci~trs art. 274 (6th ed. Dalloz 1985). One question raised by the language
quoted in text is whether such a provision in the company's articles applies to transfers among
shareholders, so that the corporation's consent is required for such a transfer. In 1976 the Cour de
cassation (France's highest court of ordinary jurisdiction) held that the reference to "a third party,
whomever he may be" in article 274 did not include shareholders of the corporation, so that a
shareholder would be free to transfer his shares to another without having the transfer subject to
approval by the company. Dessalien et Renard C. Soc. anon. Catel et Farcy, 1977 DALLOZ SIREZ
JURISPRUDENCE 455 (Cassation Commerciale 1977).
29. Code des Soc. art. 275 (6th ed. Dalloz 1985) Dessalien et Renard also laid to rest some
doubts concerning article 275, which provides that if the corporation does not approve the proposed
transferee of the shares, the directors or managers must, within three months after giving notice of
their refusal of the transfer, cause the shares to be purchased either by a shareholder, or with the
seller's consent, have them repurchased by the corporation as a reduction of its capital. The Cour de
cassation held that article 275 did not oblige the shareholder to sell to the corporation nor did it give
the corporation the right to dispossess the shareholder of his stock if he decides not to sell to the
company. Thus, the court interpreted article 275 to mean that a shareholder may renounce his
intention to sell if his proposed transaction is not approved by the corporation. See 1977 DALLOZ
SIREZ, supra note 28, at 455-56.
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registered shares.3 0
2. Public Shares' Voting Rights
Other prevalent characteristics of countries without active acquisition
markets are widespread corporate cross-ownership of shares and restric-
tions on the voting fights of publicly held shares. Cross-ownership of
shares occurs when a corporation places blocks of shares in friendly
hands to guard against hostile bids. Even in countries with active acqui-
sition markets, extensive cross-ownership tends to preclude hostile bids.
Japan represents the leading example. In Japan, patterns of corporate
cross-ownership of shares are common,31 although centralized mecha-
nisms controlling ownership and credit are much weaker than prior to
World War II.32
Restrictions on the voting rights of publicly held shares also influence
corporate acquisitions. A hostile bid will not be made for a company
unless the shares available for sale (typically the public shares) can exer-
cise sufficient voting rights to entitle a new owner to legal control or at
least effective control over the corporation. Consequently, a hostile bid
can be precluded if the voting rights of publicly held shares are restricted.
All systems of corporate law allow the issue of separate classes of stock
that hold different voting rights.3 On the European continent, however,
corporation statutes authorize an additional technique for restricting the
voting rights of publicly held shares, including common stock: the re-
striction of an owner's and his proxies' voting right to a stated number or
percentage, independent of the number of shares owned. These restric-
tions originated in response to the common use of bearer shares (as op-
posed to registered shares). In a corporation with bearer shares,
30. See Doing Business in Europe, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 29,215 (summarizing Code of
Obligations, Am. 621-22). No such restriction may be placed on bearer shares, however.
31. See T. ADAMS & N. KOBAYASHI, THE WORLD OF JAPANESE BUSINESS 53 (1969). Cross-
ownership patterns persist despite the fact that the traditional holding companies and financial com-
bines were broken up during the U.S. Occupation following World War II.
32. See B. RICHARDSON & T. UEDA, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY IN JAPAN 23 (1981). Nonethe-
less, Japanese equity markets continue to grow in attractiveness to foreign investors. Foreigners now
own about six percent of shares listed in the Tokyo stock exchange, primarily through investment
and pension funds, even though Japanese equities have an almost negligible dividend yield. See Far
Eastern Economic Review, 1984 ASIA YEARBOOK 194.
33. An additional variation is created by corporate law in the Netherlands. There, the law
authorizes the use of "priority shares" in all but the very largest public companies. Priority shares
may give binding instructions to the shareholder meeting. See Doing Business in Europe, COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 26, 719 (summarizing Civil Code, Book 2).
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management does not know the identity of shareowners unless the share-
holders appear in person at the company's annual meeting.
The Belgian corporation statute imposes one of the most extreme per-
centage restrictions on the voting rights of shareholders. The Belgian
corporation statute provides that no single shareholder (or proxy holders
on his behalf) may cast more than one fifth of the total votes. 34 Belgian
authorities view this restriction as an attempt to protect minority share-
holders. 35 The operation of the restriction is partly analogous to
mandatory cumulative voting rights in some American states.
Mandatory cumulative voting, however, merely assures sizeable minori-
ties of representation on the corporation's board of directors. In con-
trast, the Belgian rule means a majority stock owner will not be able to
cast a majority of the votes. The majority owner's ability to exercise
control thus depends on his ability to gain support from other sharehold-
ers. Such restrictions on voting rights are also permitted by German cor-
porate law. In recent years, German corporations have used these
restrictions to limit the voting power of petrodollar investors.36
The use of bearer shares can also lead to a predominance in corporate
voting for the banks in which the shares are deposited for safekeeping.
In Germany, although the "bankers' vote" has long been recognized as a
significant factor in corporate control,37 the interests of depository banks
may diverge sufficiently to weaken the banks' collective influence on cor-
porate management.38
In short, one limit on the occurrence of hostile bids is the unavailabil-
ity of shares which, if purchased, will entitle their new owner to exercise
voting control over the company. A closely related factor is the propor-
tion of shares held by the public or by institutions likely to sell in re-
sponse to an offer at an above-market price, in contrast to the proportion
of shares held in "strong hands," that is by allies of incumbent manage-
ment. The experience on the European continent with restrictions on the
voting power of shares demonstrates that such restrictions can effectively
preclude the appearance of hostile bids.
34. See id. at 21,256 (summarizing Commercial Companies Code art. 76).
35. See id.
36. See id. at 23,213. An appellate court in Germany in 1976 upheld a stockholders' resolu-
tion restricting voting rights.
37. See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 776-77 (4th ed. 1980).
38. See Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling the Modern Corporation: A Comparative View of Corpo-
rate Power in the United States and Europe, 26 AM. J. CoMP. L. 397, 415 (1978).
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II. THE TAKEOVER ENVIRONMENT
The United States, Great Britain, Canada and Australia have each had
a high level of corporate acquisition activity in recent years. After a brief
discussion of activity in the United States, this portion of the Article
presents available information concerning merger, acquisition and take-
over transactions in the three countries.
In 1985, the United States set a record for merger and acquisition ac-
tivity. The dollar amount of such transactions, estimated to be $180-190
billion, topped the 1984 record of $122.2 billion.3 9 The number of large
transactions distinguished 1985 from other years because 128 transac-
tions in 1985 were valued at more than $100 million apiece. Only eighty-
seven transactions of such value occurred in 1984. Negotiated friendly
acquisitions accounted for many of the 1985 mega-deals, although some
of these transactions concluded a series of events that began with a hos-
tile bid or a perceived threat of such a bid. Finally, in 1985, U.S. firms
agreed to thirty deals worth at least $1 billion, and four of those were
structured as leveraged buyouts. In contrast, only twelve transactions
valued at more than $1 billion took place in the U.S. between 1969 and
1980.
Great Britain also had a high level of takeover activity in 1985. This
level of activity exceeded that during the immediately preceding years.
Between April 1970 and March 1985, 3,645 takeover bids-not all of
which succeeded-were announced. 4' The Take-Over Panel described
442 bids as "failed." The total number of announced takeover bids in
1984/1985 reached 202, and the Panel characterized twenty-five of those
as "failed." The "failure" category does not include bids that were not
ultimately made, such as bids withdrawn prior to issuance of the offer
document because a higher competing offer was announced. Over the
fifteen-year period, 256 bids fell into that category, while ten bids were
withdrawn in 1984/1985. Not all of the "failures" were bids resisted by
the target company's board. The overall "success" rate for bids in Brit-
ain between April 1970 and March 1985, excluding the failed bids and
bids that otherwise did not go through, was eighty-one percent. Only
thirty-one bids were partial bids, that is bids for less than any and all of
the target's share. Several of these partial bids resulted, or if successful
39. See Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1986, at 6B, col. 1.
40. The term "announced take-over bid" includes schemes of arrangement to merge and offers
to minority shareholders. Prior to 1981, the Code did not cover private companies.
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would have resulted, in the offeror holding shares carrying less than
thirty percent of the voting rights of the target.
Some rough contrasts can be drawn between the British and United
States' failure and success rates over a portion of this period. A survey of
114 unsolicited tender offers in the United States from 1976-1980 estab-
lished that twenty-eight percent of the targets remained independent.
The offeror acquired only six percent of the targets at the price initially
offered. In twenty-six percent of the transactions, the offeror acquired
the target at a higher price. Thirty-nine percent of the targets were ac-
quired by a white-knight-a party friendly to the target's management.41
If one treats these white-knight acquisitions as "failures" from the per-
spective of the initial unsolicited offeror, then such bids had a "success
rate" of thirty-three percent (if "success" includes paying more than the
original price offered).
Canada has seen heightened takeover activity in recent years. The
dollar value of mergers in Canada from 1975-1979, adjusted for the
smaller size of the Canadian economy, was five times as large as the value
of mergers in the United States. From 1980-1985, the value of Canadian
mergers was two-and-a-half times as large as the comparable value for
the United States.4 2 Indeed, the volume of takeover activity has been
high enough to reduce the "float" (that is, the shares not owned by con-
trolling interests that are outstanding and available for trading) on the
Toronto Stock Exchange.43 The supply of public investment choices rep-
resented by the float has shrunk measurably over the last five years, even
though some shareholders who receive a cash payment in a takeover
transaction invest that cash in other equity securities, and even though
41. See Reich, Takeovers: An Outline of Current Practice, in CONFERENCE ON THE INTERNA-
TIONALIZATION OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS (1981).
42. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1986, at 34, col. 1 (referring to study by William Stanbury at the
University of British Columbia).
43. The statistics on net float loss on the TSE from 1978 to August 31, 1985 are:
Float loss due New Issues
Year to take-overs (C$ billion) Float change
1981 6.568 1.500 -5.068
1980 1.575 3.185 + 1.610
1979 2.147 1.105 -1.042
1978 2.256 .720 -1.536
Float is calculated on the market value of shares outstanding on the TSE 300 index after a deduction
for shares owned by controlling interests. See Coleman, Take-over Bids, Insider Bids and Going-
Private Transactions-Recent Developments, in SPECIAL LECTURES OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF UP-
PER CANADA: CORPORATE LAW IN THE 80s 155 (1982).
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new public issues obviously add to the volume of shares available for
public investment.
Both United States and Canadian transactions have been studied to
determine the distribution of the gains between the acquiring (or bidding)
firm and the acquired (or target) firm. The gains are represented as mea-
sured by the positive, abnormal stock returns resulting from the merger
announcement. Studies of merger and acquisition transactions in the
United States indicate that usually a takeover announcement is associ-
ated with large gains to shareholders of the target firm but only small and
statistically insignificant abnormal returns to the bidder firm.44 This dis-
crepancy might be explained by competition among bidders which would
drive the gains from the transactions to the target shareholders. Another
plausible explanation, however, is the difference in size between the typi-
cal U.S. bidder and target. In addition, in the United States many bid-
ders are "repeat players." Public knowledge that a company is a repeat
player in takeover bids might cause that company's share price to reflect
anticipated gains from its predictable level of future acquisition activity.
Evidence from studies of the Canadian market is strikingly different.
In contrast to the United States, Canadian bidders and targets both ap-
pear to enjoy statistically significant abnormal returns after takeover and
merger announcements. 45 Furthermore, Canadian bidders and targets
tend to be of similar asset size, and weak antitrust enforcement leads to a
large number of horizontal mergers. Finally, in the Canadian market, a
substantial portion of merger activity is accounted for by the multiple
acquisitions of a few relatively active acquirors.
In Australia, in recent years, many corporate takeovers have occurred.
As in Canada, much of the takeover activity appears to be attributable to
a small number of active acquirors. The Australian environment for
such transactions has several characteristics that make it unique.
As compared with the United States, relatively fewer bids in Australia
attract competing offers,46 and a larger proportion of bids fail, even in the
absence of competing bids. Further, many more bids in Australia are
partial offers-currently forty percent of all bids by recent estimatesa7-
44. See generally Eckbo, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control: The Canadian Evi-
dence 2 (Sept. 1985) (unpublished manuscript).
45. Id. at 9-10.
46. See Coffee, Partial Justice: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Context of Partial
Takeover Offers, 3 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 216, 232 (1985).
47. See id. at 216.
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while target shareholders, on average, appear to receive lower premiums
than in the United States.4" Finally, because until recently Australia did
not tax capital gains transactions, this tax-related factor, not present in
the three other countries, contributed to Australia's acquisition
activity.4 9
III. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
The legal regulation of corporate takeovers (apart from the antitrust
48. A study of transactions in the United States, conducted by the SEC's Office of Chief Econo-
mist, examined successful tender offers in calendar years 1981-1983 and covered 91 any-or-all offers,
32 two-tier, and 25 partial tender offers. The study found that the average premium for any-or-all
offers was 63.4%, that the average blended premium for two-tier offers was 55.1% and that the
average premium for partial offers was 31.3%. The study also examined the outcome of multiple-
bidder contests over the same period, in which at least one offer was a partial or a two-tier bid.
There were 26 such contests over this period, involving a total of 62 bidders. See Two-Tier Tender
Offer Pricing and Non-tender Offer Purchase Programs, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 83,637 (June 21, 1984).
The Australian study was conducted by Professor Peter Dodd for the Companies and Securities
Law Review Committee and examined offers made for companies listed on the Sydney Stock Ex-
change from July 1981 through June 1983. During this period there were 118 "full" offers (those for
100%), 26 partial offers (those for less than 100%), and 15 competing bids. Twenty-eight bids were
revised with new offer prices and closing dates. The mean premium for partial bids was 26.8% over
this period. The study also computed investment returns available to target shareholders under the
two strategies available to them after a bid is announced: strategy one-accept the offer, and strat-
egy two-sell, either when the offer is announced or when it closes. Under strategy one, the highest
return to target shareholders in full bids when the offerors accepted all tendered shares was 39.1;
under strategy two, selling at the announcement produced a mean return of 20.4 while selling at the
offer's close produced a mean return of 29.3. See Companies and Securities Law Review Committee,
Report to the Ministerial Council on Partial Takeover Bids (Aug. 1985) (Appendix).
More recent information from Australia is that the proportion of partial to full bids has increased
since 1983. See Coffee, supra note 46, at 216.
49. The Australian government imposed a capital gains tax (at ordinary income rates) on sales
of assets acquired after September 19, 1985. Homes and some personal property are exempt, and
cost bases are adjusted for the annual inflation rate. See Wail St. J., Oct. 16, 1985, at 1, col. 5.
Canada may also develop different taxation rules applicable to these transactions. Its national
government has considered a proposal to make non-deductible interest paid on acquisition debt. See
Taking Aim at Takeovers, Maclean's, April 29, 1985. Interest on acquisition debt (i.e., on funds
borrowed to acquire shares in other companies) was not deductible in Canada prior to 1972. The
then-Minister of Finance justified the shift to deductibility by arguing that, if interest on acquisition
debt continued to be non-deductible, Canadian corporations would continue to be "at a disadvantage
when competing in takeover bids with foreign corporations, which can deduct such interest in their
home country." See Bale, The Interest Deduction to Acquire Shares in Other Corporations: An Un-
fortunate Corporate Welfare Tax Subsidy, 3 CANADIAN TAX'N 189, 198 (1981). As on a number of
other regulatory issues, the Canadian choice seems consistent with a profound commitment to Cana-
dian nationalism, to a "Canada owned by Canadians," even if a highly concentrated economy ulti-
mately results. Or, in Professor Gordon Bale's trenchant observation, "[t]he fact that the whale is
Canadian does not necessarily make it beneficial to be swallowed." Id. at 200.
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dimensions, which are beyond the purview of this Article) is embedded
in a context consisting of general corporation statutes, securities regula-
tion and judicial interpretations of the fiduciary standards applicable to
decisions of corporate directors and officers. Each of these interrelated
bodies of law is important to a full understanding of the legal environ-
ment in which corporate takeovers occur. This section of the Article
briefly surveys the relevant corporate law and securities regulation for
each of the countries under discussion and discusses at length the differ-
ing treatments of corporate managers' fiduciary obligations.
As a general matter, in each system two types of legal rules are signifi-
cant to the regulation of corporate takeovers: 1) rules that, by regulating
the offeror and the terms of the offer itself, effectively raise the cost of the
acquisition to the bidder or shift on to the bidder risks that would other-
wise be borne by shareholders of the target company, and 2) rules that
define the circumstances under which the target's management-or for
that matter its shareholders-may engage in behavior or transactions
designed to defeat a hostile takeover proposal.
A. The United States
In the United States, tender offers are regulated by the Williams Act,50
enacted by Congress in 1968. The Williams Act grants the SEC author-
ity to establish rules to govern tender offers for securities of companies
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC as well
as private litigants may bring actions for relief under the statute. Many
states have also enacted statutes regulating tender offers, in some cases
inconsistently with the Williams Act provisions. The constitutionality of
state legislation in this area is frequently challenged under the supremacy
and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. 51
Prior to the enactment of the Williams Act, tender offers inhabited the
transactional equivalent of the Hobbesian state of nature: they were, at
least to some observers, nasty, brutish and, in most cases, short as well
because the offeror was free to structure the offer so that it was of brief
50. The Williams Act added §§ 13(d), 13(e), 14(d), 14(e) and 14(f) to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781; 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)(f) (1982)).
51. See, eg., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 55 U.S.L. W. 4478 (U.S. Apr. 21,
1987) (Court holds Indiana Control Share Acquisition Act is not preempted by Williams Act and
does not violate Commerce Clause); Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 U.S. 624 (1981) (Court invalidated
Illinois first generation tender offer statute under supremacy and commerce clause theories); Thomp-
son, Defining the Appropriate Realm of State and Federal Regulation of Tender Offers, 64 WASH.
U.L.Q. - (1986) (discusses fate of second and third generation tender offer statutes).
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duration. Offerors could freely define the terms and conditions of their
offers and bind offerees, once the offer was accepted, to an enforceable
contract to sell the offeree's shares. Apart from the general anti-fraud
and anti-manipulation provisions of the federal securities laws, the legal
regime was one of caveat vendor. Offerees could thus be presented with a
take-it-or-leave-it proposition with a short fuse. By reducing the possibil-
ity that any competing offer might emerge--or that the target's manage-
ment might have time to persuade the shareholders that the company
would be worth more than the offer price as an independent firm-such
offers increased the risk that offeree-shareholders would sell for less than
the company would bring in an open auction.
The Williams Act, like the other regulatory systems surveyed by this
Article, altered this situation by prescribing mandatory or minimal terms
for some elements of offers. For those matters so addressed by the stat-
ute, the offeror is no longer the full master of the offer's terms and struc-
ture. Offerors now must keep offers open for a specified minimum
period. 2 If the offer is for fewer than all of the target's shares, it may not
be made on a "first come, first served" basis. If an offer is oversub-
scribed, the offeror is required to accept shares on a prorated basis from
those shareholders who have tendered. 3 Under the Williams Act, but
not all other systems of takeover rules, shareholders have the right to
withdraw shares tendered within specified time limits and the right to
receive any increases in consideration under the offer. 4 The Act also
requires offerors to disclose specified information either prior to or con-
temporaneous with the announcement of the offer, and the target corpo-
ration's management must circulate its views on the offer to its
shareholders. Finally, the Williams Act requires that persons who ac-
quire five percent or more of a company's equity securities disclose their
interest within ten days after the acquisition."
The federal regulation of tender offerors introduced by the Williams
Act caused bidders to bear risks that otherwise could be allocated to tar-
get shareholders. Nonetheless, the assumption that the Williams Act in-
hibited the occurrence of hostile bids or, in the view of the President's
Council of Economic Advisors, "likely caused a decrease in the number
of takeovers and a decrease in the gains resulting from takeover activ-
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5).
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6).
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5), (d)(7).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d).
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ity''56 is problematic. The drafters of the Williams Act stated that they
desired its effect to be neutral as between offerors and target manage-
ment.17  Implicitly, a statutory posture of neutrality toward a type of
transaction tends to legitimate it.
Further, Congressional enactment of the Williams Act jeopardized in-
hibitive state regulation of tender offers. This effect is significant because
the states' regulatory choices on these transactions tended to be more
restrictive than the regulatory posture embodied in the Williams Act. To
be sure, the Williams Act did not oust the states' ability to regulate trans-
actions in corporate control through provisions in state corporation stat-
utes that define the attributes of shares or that regulate or prohibit
various corporate transactions. In CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corpo-
ration of America, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Indiana
Control Share Acquisition Act, which effectively conditions acquisition
of control of a corporation on approval of a majority of the corporation's
preexisting distinterested shareholders. Unlike an Illinois statute earlier
invalidated by the Court, the Indiana statute applies only to corporations
incorporated in Indiana, imposes no indefinite delay on tender offers, and
does not enable the state itself to determine the merits of the offer.5 8 The
56. See President's Council of Economic Advisors, 1984 Report at S-40 (BNA Special
Supplement).
57. See, eg., S. RP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
58. 55 U.S.L.W. 4483 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1987). The Illinois statute was held unconstitutional in
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). A majority of the Court held that the statute impermis-
sibly interfered with interstate commerce; a plurality also believed it to be preempted by the Wil-
liams Act.
One perplexing question left open by the Court's analysis in CTS Corp. is the constitutional signifi-
cance of the fact that the Indiana statute applies only to companies incorporated in that state. Many
passages in the majority's opinion emphasize that the law of a corporation's state of incorporation
has traditionally been thought to define its attributes and regulate its internal affairs. See, e.g., id. at
4483 ("[t]his beneficial free market system depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation-
except in the rarest situations-is organized under, and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction,
traditionally the corporate law of its state of incorporation.") On the other hand, the Indiana
statute itself additionally requires for applicability that the corporation have its principal place of
business, or substantial assets in Indiana, plus ten percent of its shareholders resident in the state or
more than ten percent of its shares owned by Indiana residents or ten thousand shareholders resident
in Indiana. The Court's opinion, after noting that Indiana would have no legitimate interest "in
protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations," observes that "[m]oreover, unlike
the Illinois statute invalidated in MITE, the Indiana Act applies only to corporations that have a
substantial number of shareholders in Indiana." 55 U.S.L.W. at 4484 (emphasis in original). If
shareholders' state residency is constitutionally crucial, the practical appeal of Indiana-style statutes
to popular states for incorporation-like Delaware-that have relatively few shareholders of any
particular corporation resident in them may be limited.
Delaware's advisory group for corporate law recently decided not to submit a proposal based on
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/3
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outer limits of the states' regulatory capacity await further legislation
and litigation. It is noteworthy that in neither of the other two federal
systems discussed in this Article-Canada and Australia-has the con-
tent of takeover regulation been complicated by ongoing tensions stem-
ming from federalism itself. Thus, unresolved quandries about the terms
of coexistence between federal and state law are not inevitable conse-
quences of a federalist division of legislative competence.
A further issue in the regulation of offerors is whether to restrict the
offeror's discretion to condition its bid. The offeror's ability to condition
its bid freely, that is to condition its obligation to take and pay for ten-
dered shares on the occurrence or non-occurrence of any number of pos-
sible events, is important to defining the cost and risk the offeror bears in
making the bid. Unlimited power to condition the bid is unlimited power
to shift to the offeree risks that would otherwise be borne by the offeror.
The Williams Act, however, does not restrict the offeror's ability to con-
dition its bid. Offerors in the United States frequently include in the offer
conditioning language addressing such matters as the availability of fi-
nancing for the transaction and the absence of significant litigation chal-
lenging the transaction. Nor is there any requirement in the United
the Indiana statute to the legislature. See Delaware Fails to Adopt Law on Takeovers, Wall St. J.,
June 16, 1987, at 2, col. 2. One feature of the Indiana statute that may limit its appeal to other
jurisdictions is a provision entitling the aequiror of shares to require that the corporation's manage-
ment call a special meeting within fifty days of the acquisition so the other shareholders can vote on
whether to confer voting power on the shares of their new fellow shareholder. Ind. Code § 23-1-42-7
(Supp. 1986). As the triggering event is the filing of an "Acquiring Person Statement" describing a
proposed acquisition, the putative acquiring person need not own the shares at the time of the filing.
This enables any potential bidder to require a shareholder vote on any takeover proposal, by describ-
ing a plan to acquire sufficient shares to trigger the statutory provision. In contrast, under Delaware
law a corporation's directors are not obliged to refer unsolicitated takeover proposals to sharehold-
ers. Further, under the Delaware statute, only a corporation's directors have the right to call a
special shareholders' meeting unless the corporation's certificate or bylaws authorize other persons
to call the meeting. Del. Code, tit. 8, § 21 l(d) (1983). Thus, in the absence of a certificate or bylaw
provision creating such a right, Delaware law does not entitle a corporation's present shareholders-
or prospective control shareholder-to compel a special meeting to be held.
One might well wonder whether the provision in the Indiana statute entitling the prospective
control shareholder to compel a special meeting is crucial to the statute's constitutionality. The
Court's preemption analysis in CTS Corp. emphasizes that the Indiana statute "does not give either
management or the offeror an advantage in communicating with the shareholders about the impend-
ing offer." 55 U.S.L.W. at 4482. The offeror's ability to compel the special meeting contributes
greatly to the statute's appearance of even-handedness. The Court's opinion also characterizes the
statute as a device for empowering shareholders as a collective body. But unless the acquiring per-
son is able to compel a shareholder meeting to be called, it is much more difficult to view the statu-
tory disenfranchisement of its shares as merely an incident of an even-handed empowerment of the
corporation's other shareholders.
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States that large share acquisitions be made through a general offer to all
shareholders.5 9  Offerors are, however, prohibited from making
purchases other than through the tender offer itself once the offer has
been announced. ° In short, and in contrast with the other regulatory
systems discussed below, offerors in the United States have considerable
discretion in structuring acquisitions.
Counterpoised with the relative freedom of offerors in the United
States is the freedom of target company management to discourage hos-
tile offers generally and to frustrate particular unwelcome bids. These
questions are not addressed by the federal statute and remain the prov-
ince of state corporate law. Courts assess management's decisions in
these respects against the fiduciary obligations of care and loyalty to the
corporation. Although the officers and directors of target corporations
are freer in the United States than in some other systems to engage in
defensive tactics, that freedom is not unbounded, and the fiduciary norms
are of real significance.
The central question in the American cases, explored most fully in
Delaware and New York, is the extent to which a court will defer to the
decision of the corporation's directors, by treating the decision as an ex-
ercise of the directors' discretionary business judgment, to defend the
corporation against an actual or prospective offer by deploying defenses
against a particular offer or constructing anti-takeover devices with more
generalized effect. The line of significant Delaware authority begins in
1964 with Cheff v. Mathes. In Cheff, the corporation's directors caused
the corporation to repurchase, at a premium over market price, the stock
held by a shareholder who had demanded a seat on the board and criti-
cized the corporation's method of product distribution.6' The Delaware
Supreme Court held that the directors' burden of justifying the repur-
chase could be satisfied by a showing of good faith and reasonable inves-
tigation. The court interpreted this standard to require the directors to
show reasonable grounds for belief that the shareholder's continued
stock ownership constituted "a danger to corporate policy and effective-
ness." The Cheff court found that the directors made such a showing.62
59. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1986).
61. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
62. Id.; but see Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967), in
which the chancery court held that no showing had been made that the plaintiff represented "a
reasonable threat to the continued existence" of the corporation, whose directors had issued a large
block of authorized shares to a third party to abort the plaintiff's tender offer for the corporation.
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Some commentators have criticized the Cheff court for being unduly le-
nient and for permitting the use of corporate assets to preserve the in-
cumbents' control, so long as the directors were able to demonstrate, in
retrospect, the existence of a dispute with the challenger over some as-
pect of corporate policy.6 3 Nonetheless, in the same era, the Delaware
Supreme Court imposed limits on the tactics available to management
resisting challenges to its control. In Schnell v. Christ-Craft Industries,
Inc., a majority of the court held that the corporation's directors had
abused their amendment power over the corporation's bylaws by revising
them to advance the date of the shareholders' meeting, thereby dis-
rupting the dissidents' proxy fight.' 4
Federal courts have interpreted Delaware law to embody a "business
judgment" standard that insulates the merits of directors' decisions from
judicial scrutiny in the absence of fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching or
abuse of discretion.65 This federal statement of Delaware law may, none-
theless, be unduly broad in light of more recent Delaware cases.
Although some recent cases have upheld directors' use of specific defen-
sive tactics, not all have deferred to the directors' decisions. The more
recent Delaware cases examine much more closely the fit between the
alleged threat to the corporation and each defensive transaction author-
ized by the directors. In these cases, the Delaware courts do not treat the
appropriateness or necessity of defensive transactions as falling within
the unreviewable discretion of the directors.
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,66 the Delaware Supreme
Court held that the directors of a target corporation properly exercised
sound business judgment in responding to a hostile two-tier tender offer
with a self-tender by the target for its own shares. In Unocal, the court
emphasized that the directors' actions cannot be motivated solely or pri-
marily by a desire to retain office. Their actions must reflect "a good
faith concern for the corporation and its stockholders," and, in all cir-
63. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
674-75 (1984).
64. 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). in Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 402 (Del. 1985),
the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a bylaw amendment, adopted through the statutory share-
holder consent procedure after an acquiring person obtained control of 51% of the corporation's
voting stock, that required a unanimous vote of all directors to take action, and required the pres-
ence of all directors for a quorum at meetings.
65. See, eg., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981).
66. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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cumstances, their actions must be free of any fraud or other miscon-
duct.67 Further, the directors' response must be "reasonable in relation
to the threat posed;",61 thus, the directors must analyze the nature of the
offer and its effect on the corporate enterprise. On both of these ques-
tions, the initial burden of proof lies with the directors.
Later the same year, in Moran v. Household International, Inc.,69 the
court upheld a corporation's adoption of a "rights plan" in advance of
any actual offer. The intricate plan entitled each shareholder to rights
that were triggered by a tender offer for thirty percent of the company's
stock or by an acquisition of twenty percent of its stock by any single
entity or group.70 If a merger or consolidation occurred after anyone
acquired twenty percent of the company's stock, the other shareholders
would be entitled to buy $200 of the acquiror's common stock for $100,
unless the rights were redeemed by the issuer's directors. The court held
that the business judgment rule, as construed in Unocal, applied to the
board's adoption of a defensive mechanism designed to ward off future
offers.71 The directors sufficiently established that they had adopted the
plan in response to the threat of two-tier offers, that they were not grossly
negligent in adopting the plan, and that the plan was a reasonable defen-
sive mechanism in light of the perceived threat. No allegation was made
that the plan was adopted in bad faith or to entrench the directors in
office. Finally, as in Unocal, the Moran court stressed the enhanced cred-
ibility of defensive measures adopted by directors who are independent
outsiders.72
Nonetheless, to assess fully the significance of Unocal and Moran, one
must take into account two other contemporaneous Delaware cases. In
Smith v. Van Gorkom,73 the court applied a gross negligence standard to
decide whether directors had exercised an appropriate degree of care in
making decisions related to significant corporate transactions. The court
held the directors' behavior in Smith did not meet this standard because
they assented to a merger proposal without the benefit of extensive delib-
erations or an expert's opinion on the company's value.7a The directors
67. Id. at 955.
68. Id.
69. 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Del. 1985).
70. Id. at 1349.
71. Id. at 1350, 1356.
72. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
73. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
74. Id at 864.
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reached their decision quickly and without inquiry into the basis for the
merger price or the consequences and structure of the merger agreement.
Finally, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.," the
Delaware Supreme Court invalidated a target's grant of an option on its
most valuable assets, at a price unfavorable to the target, to a bidding
group proposing a leveraged buyout. The bidding group included mem-
bers of the target's senior management. The target granted the option to
the management group during a bidding contest with a hostile offeror
who had made a series of cash bids for any and all shares and had an-
nounced its determination to top any bid made by the management
group.76 The court held that the board's grant of the option demon-
strated apparent self-interest because it was motivated, at least in part, by
the directors' wish to alleviate the legal consequences of an earlier defen-
sive transaction by retaining the involvement of the management-allied
bidding group. In exchange for the option, the management group
agreed to take steps that would protect the directors against liability aris-
ing from the earlier transaction."7 The Revlon court did not find lock-up
options inherently improper, but asserted that the business judgment rule
does not protect their adoption when the sale and dispersal of the com-
pany's assets appear to be inevitable. Beyond that point, the directors'
role is limited to the auctioneering function of obtaining the highest price
for the corporation's assets.
Recent judicial interpretations of New York law have also imposed
limits on the ability of directors to defend aggressively against hostile
offers under the protective mantle of the business judgment rule. In Nor-
lin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, Inc.,78 the target's directors responded to large
and unwelcome purchases of the corporation's stock by issuing common
and voting preferred stock to a Panamanian subsidiary and a newly cre-
ated employee stock ownership plan. The stock issued in response to the
unwelcome purchases effectively assured the board of continued and irre-
frangible voting control over the target. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, applying New York law, held that the
directors' desire to retain control, indeed to do so at all costs, appeared to
75. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
76. Id. at 178.
77. The target had previously offered to buy 10 million shares of its common stock in exchange
for subordinated notes and preferred stock. The noteholders threatened to sue after the market price
of the notes fell when the target announced its intention to accept the buyout proposal. Id. at 177.
78. 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
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be their sole justification for issuing the stock. Further, the court held
that the defendants had not established that their actions were "legiti-
mate" or "fair and reasonable." 79
The same court invalidated the defensive use of a lockup option on
substantial target assets in Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition,
Inc. 80 In Hanson Trust, as in Revlon, the directors granted the asset op-
tion to a bidding group proposing a leveraged buyout, including an eq-
uity stake in the enterprise for members of the target's senior
management after the consummation of the buy out.81 Further, the op-
tion price appeared quite favorable to the bidding group and unfavorable
to the issuer. Although the directors' adoption of the option could not be
characterized as grossly negligent, the Hanson Trust court held that the
plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of a lack of due care and raised
sufficient doubts concerning the directors' commitment to protecting
shareholder interests. Consequently, the directors had the burden of jus-
tifying the option transaction and its terms. After the directors failed to
meet this burden, the court granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction
against the exercise of the option.82
Thus, recent cases have interpreted Delaware and New York law to
impose substantial limitations on the protection afforded by the business
judgment rule to directors' adoption of defenses against hostile tender
offers. Defensive transactions are most likely to be vulnerable in litiga-
tion if: 1) they are adopted in the midst of an active bidding contest;
2) the decision to adopt the defense does not appear duly deliberative and
mindful of its consequences; 3) the effect of the defense is to terminate
the bidding contest; and 4) the directors' decision has self-interested
qualities. In contrast to the British and Australian precedents, however,
even these recent American cases do not suggest that directors of a target
improperly interfere with the constitutional prerogatives of shareholders
in defending against hostile bids.83
79. Id. at 265-66.
80. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
81. Id. at 267-72. In Hanson Trust, however, unlike Revlon, although the target's board knew
some of its officers would obtain equity in the new company, their identities had not been disclosed
at the time the target's directors had first approved the buyout agreement.
82. Id. at 274-77, 283.
83. One recent Delaware case suggests that the duty owed to stockholders may be different if
the directors act to undo the consequences of a successfully completed takeover bid. In Frantz Mfg.
Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985), the target board issued a large block of stock to an
Employee Stock Ownership Plan after the unwelcome acquiring party obtained 51% of its voting
stock and submitted shareholder consents to amend the target's bylaws to protect its position. The
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B. Great Britain
Most regulation of takeovers in Britain is extra-legal. Although the
Companies Act, by defining corporations' legal powers, limits the defen-
sive transactions available to targets, the rules regulating bidders and
targets in bids for public, and some private, companies are contained in
the City Code, the product of the Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers. In
some respects, the City Code's regulation of bidders is similar to that
imposed by the Williams Act. The Code, like the Williams Act, requires
extensive disclosure by bidders,84 sets a minimum duration for offers,85
and requires prorated acceptance for over-subscribed partial bids.86 The
Code also grants withdrawal rights to tendering shareholders, although
these rights differ somewhat in technical respects from the withdrawal
rights granted by the Williams Act.87 The code, unlike the Williams Act,
regulates conditions imposed on offers and disapproves of conditions
"depending solely on subjective judgments by the directors of the offeror
or the fulfillment of which is in their hands."88 But offerors in Britain,
unlike offerors in the United States, are permitted to purchase target
shares outside the offer itself even after the offer has been announced.89
In its treatment of partial bids the Code differs more strikingly from
the Williams Act. The Panel's consent is required for any partial offer.
The Panel normally grants consent for those bids that will result in the
offeror holding shares with less than thirty percent of the target's voting
rights. The Panel will not grant consent, however, for any offer that
would give the offeror more than thirty percent but less than one hun-
court held the board's retrospective defense was not protected by the business judgment rule and
constituted inequitable conduct.
84. See PANEL ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND
MERGERS, Rule 24 (1985) [hereinafter CITY CODE].
85. Id. Rule 31.1.
86. Id. Rule 36.7 ("Scaling Down").
87. Under Rule 34 of the City Code, target shareholders must have the right to withdraw
shares after 21 days from the first closing date of the initial offer, if that offer has not by that date
become or been declared unconditional as to offeree acceptances. Rule 10 requires, for any offer that
if successful would result in the offeror holding more than 50% of the voting rights in the target, that
the offer provide that it will not be declared unconditional unless the offeror has acquired or receives
acceptances giving it over 50% of the voting rights. The net effect of this requirement is that target
stockholders may tender, wait to see whether the bidder acquires the mandatory minimum, and then
"detender" the shares and "retender" them to any subsequent bidder, if the bidder fails to achieve
the mandatory minimum. Id. Rules 10, 34.
88. Id. Rule 13.
89. Id. Rule 27.1. The offeror is under a duty imposed by Rule 27.1 to include any material
change in its shareholdings in its communications with offeree shareholders after the offer is made.
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dred percent of the target's voting rights if the offeror or its associates
have purchased shares in the target during the preceding twelve
months.9" Indeed, the Panel's consent is required to purchase any target
shares during the twelve months after any partial bid; purchases during a
partial bid are prohibited. 91 Finally, shareholders with a majority of the
target's voting securities must approve separately any partial offer that
could give the offeror more than thirty percent of the target's voting
rights.92
The City Code makes partial bids less attractive as a means of acquir-
ing effective control of a target. In particular, the requirement of a sepa-
rate shareholder plebiscite significantly restricts the offeror's ability to
acquire a substantial position by offering a relatively low premium be-
cause it permits shareholders to tender their shares while voting against
the transaction itself. Thus, the separate voting requirement reduces the
risk that a partial bid at a low premium will succeed simply because tar-
get shareholders will tender because they fear being left behind, with a
new controlling stockholder, if their fellows tender.93 The restrictions on
share purchases before and after partial bids may also make the partial
bid unattractive, while protecting shareholders against the risk that the
offeror will acquire shares at prices higher than the partial bid price.
The City Code also imposes on offerors and other persons who acquire
a sizeable number of shares an obligation to offer to buy out the target's
remaining shareholders. This requirement has no counterpart in the
Williams Act. Under the Code, any person who, together with those
persons acting in concert with him, acquires thirty percent or more of the
voting securities or rights of a target is obliged to make an offer to the
target's remaining shareholders (whether their shares are voting or non-
voting) at the highest price paid by the acquiring person or its associates
for shares of that class within the preceding twelve months.94  This
buyout requirement is structured to apply to sizeable share acquisitions
independent of the acquisition technique used, so that stock market
transactions or privately negotiated acquisitions, as well as formal tender
offers, all trigger the obligation.
The City Code's imposition of a buyout requirement accomplishes a
90. Id. Rules 36.1 & 36.2.
91. Id Rule 36.3.
92. Id Rule 36.5.
93. See Gonski & Keenan, Partial Takeovers, 7 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 217 (1984).
94. CiTy CODE, supra note 84, Rule 9.
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number of separate goals. First, it insures that all shareholders, non-
controlling as well as controlling, will share equally in any premium paid
by a buyer so long as at least thirty percent of the company's shares are
sold. Second, it protects non-selling shareholders against the risk that
the new controlling shareholder will exploit its position to their disad-
vantage.9 Third, it eliminates the possibility that non-selling sharehold-
ers (especially those in the wake of a successful partial bid) will be bought
out in a freezeout merger for a lesser consideration that that of the tender
offer.
The position of target management also differs in Britain. The City
Code requires that all offers be put in the first instance to the target's
board or its advisors,96 who must obtain "competent independent ad-
vice" on the offer and share the substance of that advice with their share-
holders.97 The Code also requires that any information given by a target
to a preferred offeror be made equally available, on request, to other bona
fide offerors or potential offerors. 9s Once an offer has been made or ap-
pears to be imminent, the Code requires that defensive transactions,
which could frustrate the offer, be tested by a shareholder plebiscite. If
the target board proposes to: 1) issue shares or options on shares; 2) cre-
ate or issue securities convertible into shares; 3) sell or agree to sell any
material amount of assets; or 4) enter into contracts "otherwise than in
the ordinary course of business," the shareholders must vote in a general
meeting to approve the transaction.99 Shareholder approval is also re-
quired if the target attempts to redeem or purchase its own shares when
an offer has been announced or appears imminent.1" These rules do not,
however, reach transactions that precede the time an offer is announced
or reasonably appears to be in the offing.
95. Shareholders in British companies who object to such treatment appear to be in a weaker
position than their American counterparts to resolve their problem through litigation. For a full
development of this comparison, see DeMott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons
from the British, 58 N.Y.U.L. REv. 945, 992-94 (1983).
96. CrrY CODE, supra note 84, Rule 1.
97. Id. Rule 3.1.
98. Id. Rule 19.4. The unwelcome offeror must, nonetheless, ask specific questions of the target
company and cannot simply ask in general terms for all information provided to its competitors. Id.
99. Id. Rule 21. Shareholder approval is not required if the target board is acting to fulfill
obligations under a prior contract.
100. Id. Rule 37.3(a). If the effect of a share repurchase or redemption is to give the directors
and persons acting in concert with them 30% of the company's voting rights, they are obliged to
make a follow-up bid to the remaining shareholders, subject to possible waiver by the Panel if an
independent vote of stockholders occurs and procedures prescribed by the Panel for seeking the
waiver are followed. See id. Rule 37.3 & Appendix A ("Whitewash Guidance Note").
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Recently, target managements have mounted flamboyant advertising
campaigns in the popular media to defend against hostile bids, but with-
out uniform success. The Panel responded in 1986 by banning advertise-
ments bearing on an offer or potential offer unless they are confined to
"noncontroversial information" and they avoid "argument or
invective.'"101
The Code's treatment of defensive transactions developed against a
legal context that imposes substantial restrictions on the ability of the
target's directors to use their powers to defeat hostile takeover bids. In
the leading case, Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd., °2 after receiving an unsolic-
ited bid for all of the company's common and preferred shares, the tar-
get's board responded by establishing a trust for the benefit of the
company's employees, appointing themselves trustees of the trust, and
issuing to the trust a large block of authorized but theretofore unissued
preferred stock, which was assigned ten votes per share. The trust was
designed to assure that over half of the votes were in friendly hands."0 3
The court held that this use of the directors' power to allot shares was
improper. Interestingly enough, the court faulted neither the directors'
good faith nor their motivation to maintain a management structure they
believed to be more advantageous to the company's shareholders, staff
and company than that of the management likely to follow a successful
takeover offer. Instead, in the court's view, the directors acted simply to
retain their control and improperly interfered with the "constitutional
rights" of a potential shareholder majority by preventing the bidder's of-
fer from reaching the shareholders. Hogg v. Cramphorn reasoned that
while directors may choose to pursue many courses, they nonetheless are
under an obligation not to use their power to oppress shareholders.'0 4
The significance of Hogg v. Cramphorn, Ltd. is not so much one of
immediate and practical application in Britain (where the City Code now
regulates defensive tactics in bids for most companies) but as a statement
of principle to be followed, or at least distinguished, by Commonwealth
courts outside Britain. In this respect, as noted below, the force of the
principle appears to have been somewhat vitiated by later Common-
wealth cases. In a subsequent case in Britain, Cayne v. Global National
101. See id. Rule 19.2; The Times [London], Mar. 27, 1986, at 21, col. 2.
102. [1967] I Ch. 254 (1963).
103. Id. at 265-71.
104. Id.
[Vol. 65:69
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/3
TAKEOVER REGULATION
Resources P.L. C.,1 ° 5 Vice Chancellor Megarry took the position that the
principle of Hogg v. Cramphorn "must not be carried too far." Although
in his view directors' actions are improper if they are motivated solely by
a desire to retain or preserve "control as such," if other elements are
present as well, the motivation of retaining control is not necessarily im-
proper.106 An example set in the opinion is a defensive allotment of
shares by a target to defeat a business competitor's acquisition of shares
in the target "with the object of running [the target] down so as to lessen
its competition."1 °7 Thus, even under the British authorities, target di-
rectors may be able to justify defensive share allotments (and other trans-
actions as well) on the basis of their full range of motivations as directors
for seeking to retain control. Nevertheless, the extremity of the example
used in Cayne leaves open the question of how concrete and palpable the
projected injury to the target must be in order to support the directors'
use of their powers to preserve their control. 108
The position of directors in British companies is also, of course, de-
fined by provisions in statutory company law. Of particular significance
is the fact that company law provides for the removal of directors by
ordinary resolutions passed by a simple majority of shareholders, without
a showing of cause for removal, and notwithstanding anything to the
105. Cayne v. Global Natl Resources P.L.C., unreported, (Ch. Div. Aug. 12, 1982) (Megarry,
V.C.), aff'd on other grounds, [1984] 1 All E.R. 225, 225 (Ct. Ap. 1982) (denying plaintiff's motion
for an interlocutory injunction). Vice-Chancellor Megarry's opinion is noted in Barrett, Compa-
nies-Issue of Shares to Preserve Existing Control- Whether Breach of Directors'Fiduciary Duties, 56
AusT. L.J. 600 (1982).
106. See Barrett, supra note 105, at 600.
107. Id.
108. Another question raised in the British literature is whether the principle of Hogg v.
Cramphorn applies to a target company that is the object or victim of a "Dawn Raid." A Dawn
Raid is the purchase on the Stock Exchange of up to 29.9% of the company's shares at a premium
price in a matter of minutes. See Lazarides, The Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors, 1983
LONDON L. REV. 67, 75 (Part 2). Dawn Raids, however, have been regulated since 1980 by rules
that apply to acquisitions of 10% or more of a target's shares within any seven-day period, if the
acquiring person will, as a result, own 15% of the voting rights in the target. These rules require
that any such acquisition be made either through a partial offer recommended by the target's board
and subject to the rules of the CITY CODE, or through an offer on the Stock Exchange announced at
least seven days before the offer closes. See COUNCIL FOR THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY, THE RULES
GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITIONS OF SHARES (1985). Dawn Raids were objectionable be-
cause they enabled the purchaser to acquire either effective control or a substantial toehold at an
inflated price, and then to wait for the price of target shares to drop before making an offer (at a
lower price) to the remaining shareholders. If the anti-Dawn-Raid rules effectively reduce the risk
that this sequence of transactions will occur, the justification for defensive share allotments by the
target's board is weakened accordingly.
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contrary in the company's articles or in any agreement between the com-
pany and the director.10 9 In contrast, in the United States, the Delaware
corporation statute provides that directors whose terms are staggered (so
that not all directors' terms expire each year) are only removable for
cause unless the company's certificate of incorporation states to the con-
trary.11 ° This difference in statutory treatment appears to suggest that
the tenure in office of British directors is inevitably more tenuous than
that of their Delaware counterparts. But this apparent difference should
not be overemphasized. In 1970, the House of Lords held that a provi-
sion in a company's articles that assigned multiple votes to shares held by
a director only in respect of a resolution to remove him from office was
valid and was not inconsistent with the statutory prescription of removal
by ordinary resolution."' To be sure, British cases since 1970 mention
shareholder resolutions to remove directors but do not note the existence
of weighted voting protections for the directors.1 12 Whether the non-use
of weighted voting to protect directors against removal reflects more than
simple inattention to the possibility is an unanswerable question.
A final point about English company law relevant to takeover transac-
109. Companies Act, 1985, § 303(1).
110. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1974). A director who has been elected through cumula-
tive voting cannot be removed if the number of shares cast against the resolution to remove would be
sufficient to elect, if voted cumulatively.
111. See Bushell v. Faith, [1970] App. Cas. 1099 (H.L.). The House members reached this result
in a majority of the speeches by assuming that Parliament could have prohibited such a use of
weighted voting had it chosen to do so. Lord Morris' dissenting speech argued that the outcome
thwarted the purpose of the statutory provision by making a director irremovable and thereby made
a mockery of the law. Id. at 1106. Lord Donovan rejoined that Lord Morris' argument necessarily
assumed that Parliament "intended to cover every possible case and block up every loophole." Id. at
1110 (emphasis in original). He viewed that assumption as unwarranted:
[Tihere may be good reasons why Parliament should leave some companies with free-
dom of manoeuvre in this particular matter. There are many small companies which arc
conducted in practice as though they were little more than partnerships, particularly fam-
ily companies running a family business; and it is, unfortunately, sometimes necessary to
provide some safeguard against family quarrels having their repercussions in the
boardroom....
Id. at 1110-11 (emphasis added). The difficulty with this argument is that the majority's position
does not limit the use of weighted voting only to some companies, but enables all to insulate directors
against removal through removal-triggered weighted voting. Nonetheless, for this device to be effec-
tive in a publicly held company, either the directors must own many shares, or the weighting factor
must be spectacularly large.
112. On a not entirely unrelated matter, the Judicial Committee upheld, on an appeal from a
New Zealand case, an employment contract with a managing director that entitled him to a lump
sum payment equal to five times his gross annual salary, grossed up for income tax purposes, in the
event of a takeover of the company. See The Taupa Totera Lumber Co., Ltd. v. Rowe, [1977] 3 All.
E.R. 123 (P.C.).
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tions is that the Companies Act, in contrast to corporation statutes in
Canada and the United States, but like Australian corporation statutes,
does not contain provisions that readily enable negotiated corporate
mergers and acquisitions to be executed in a simple and straightforward
fashion, based on the negotiation of an agreement to merge or sell assets,
followed by approval from the company's directors and shareholders.
Transactions in which a corporation agrees to merge with or sell all of its
assets to another corporation are chanelled by the Companies Act into
provisions dealing with voluntary winding-up transactions. The provi-
sions require shareholders' authorization in a general meeting, rights of
dissent for shareholders, the appointment of a liquidator for the com-
pany, and an account of the winding-up from the liquidator to the public
registrar of companies. 1 3 The mechanics of the takeover bid, in con-
trast, may be executed more simply and quickly. In short, an important
facet of the transactional climate in Britain, and in Australia, is that at
least some transactions which in the United States or Canada probably
could be structured as negotiated mergers, are executed as takeover bids,
due to the complexity and awkwardness of corporate statutory law.
C. Canada
In general, Canadian corporate law and securities regulation pertinent
to takeover regulation demonstrate the influence of both the United
States and Great Britain. Geographic proximity and historical circum-
stance make this unsurprising. Until recently, Alberta, British Colum-
bia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Ontario were "uniform act" provinces
for securities regulation with substantially similar statutes, and Quebec,
although not formally a uniform act province, developed compatible leg-
islation. Statutory uniformity seems to be the legal counterpart to the
Canadian view that the country has a "genuinely national capital mar-
ket."' 14 Provincial securities legislation began to diverge in 1979 with
the enactment of a new securities act, now in effect in Ontario, which
contains provisions regulating corporate takeovers that no other province
has adopted. In other respects, however, some of the other provincial
statutes are compatible with the Ontario statute.
Although the discussion that follows focuses primarily on Ontario,
statutes and cases from other provinces are noted as well. Ontario's im-
113. Companies Act, 1985, §§ 572-605.
114. See SECURMES INDUSTRY COMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 12, at 5.
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portance in takeover regulation is enhanced by the jurisdictional breadth
of provincial securities legislation in Canada. The provincial statutes ap-
ply to takeover bids for any company, regardless of the provincial situs of
its incorporation, when the bid is made by any shareholder whose last
registered address on the target's books is in a particular province."1 '
Canada also has a national corporation statute, which includes provi-
sions regulating takeovers, applicable only to corporations incorporated
under that statute.
Under the Ontario Securities Act, a "takeover bid" is defined as any
offer to purchase voting securities"1 6 in the target that would, if accepted,
result in the offeror owning more than twenty percent of the target's vot-
ing securities, 117 unless the transaction fits within a stated exemption. A
takeover bid may not be made except in compliance with the statute's
requirements which include a general offer to all the corporation's share-
holders. The two most notable exemptions cover bids made through the
facilities of the Toronto Stock Exchange ("TSE"), which are regulated
separately by the TSE, and purchases made privately from fourteen or
fewer stockholders. As in the United States, partial bids are freely al-
lowed, subject to a proration requirement in the event of oversubscrip-
tion and to separate timing requirements.' 18
In addition to requiring that significant share acquisitions be struc-
tured as "all-holders" offers at one price, the Ontario statute requires an
acquiring person in some circumstances to offer to buy out the target's
remaining stockholders. Under § 91(1) of the statute, an offeror who be-
comes the owner of more than twenty percent of the target's voting se-
curities through a private agreement with fourteen or fewer holders
115. The securities bar in Canada appears to view with dismay the prospect that the Ontario
Securities Commission could use its considerable statutory powers to compel compliance with the
Ontario legislation when the issuer involved is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange, but is not
incorporated in Ontario, and the vendors and purchasers of securities are not Ontario residents. The
use of the TSE listing for this purpose has been pejoratively termed the "sandbox theory." See
Coleman, supra note 43, at 210.
116. The Ontario statute applies to a transaction if at least one owner of the voting securities
covered by the offer has a last address in Ontario on the target's books. Thus, the statute may apply
to transactions completed outside Ontario. If no vendor is an Ontario resident, the statute is inappli-
cable unless shares were transferred to a non-Ontario resident for the purpose of avoiding the stat-
ute. See The Securities Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 466, § 88(1)(d) (1980) (defining "offeree").
117. The takeover provisions of the Canada Business Corporations Act, in contrast, are trig-
gered by acquisition of 10% of the voting securities of a CBCA company. See Canada Business
Corporations Act, I CAN. STAT. ch. 33 (1974-75-76).
118. See The Securities Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 466, § 89(1)(8) (1980).
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(which is exempt from the general offer requirement) is obliged to make a
follow-up offer to the target's remaining stockholders of the same class if
there is a published market for the securities and the value of the consid-
eration paid by the offeror under the private agreement exceeds the ex-
isting market price plus reasonable brokerage fees and other
commissions. 1 9 "Market price" has been defined by the Ontario Securi-
ties Commission as "an amount 15 percent in excess of the simple aver-
age of the closing price of securities of that class for each day on which
there was a closing price and falling not more than ten business days
before the relevant date."' 12 0 Thus, the offeror who pays a premium of
less than fifteen percent to offerees in a private transaction is not subject
to the statutory buyout obligation, nor, for that matter, to the mandatory
bid requirement. The Ontario statute also exempts as de minimis acqui-
sitions of up to five percent of the target's voting securities by the offeror
and its affiliates within a twelve month period, so long as the price paid
does not exceed any published market price plus reasonable fees and
commissions. The availability of this exemption, however, is limited by
the fact that acquisitions made through an exempt TSE bid must be
counted against the five percent limit. Acquisitions made through an ex-
empt private agreement or through a general offer to stockholders do not
count against the five percent.1
2
'
The Ontario strictures on bidders are clearly the result of a concern
that control premiums should be shared with all stockholders when suffi-
cient shares to constitute effective control are bought from a small
number of shareholders.' 22 Indeed, the bidder's obligation to buy out the
remaining stockholders is triggered only by the "private agreement"
119. See id. at § 91(1). The follow up offer must be "at least equal in value" to the price paid
under the private agreement and it must be made within 180 days of the date of the private agree-
ment. Id.
120. Ontario Securities Commission, Securities Act Regulation § 163(3), in 3 Can. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 50-540b (1983).
121. See 2 V. ALBOINI, SECURITIES LAW AND PRACTICE § 19.3.12 (1984).
122. See, eg., COMMrITEE TO REVIEW THE PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES ACT (ONTARIO)
RELATING TO TAKE-OVER BIDS AND ISSUER BIDS, REPORT Nos. 15-16 (Sept. 23, 1983). This
report proposed that the obligation to make a follow-up bid be eliminated from the statute and, in its
stead, that "private agreements" exempt from the general offer requirement be prohibited if they
involved a price in excess of 115% of the market price averaged over the 20 preceding days. Id. at
16. The nature of the proposed substitute for the follow-up bid--denying an exemption from the
obligation to make an all-holders bid if a premium of more than 15% is paid to fourteen or fewer
shareholders-makes it apparent that Ontario's narrow buyout requirement was a response to per-
ceived inequalities surrounding sales of control shares by small numbers of shareholders. The Re-
port's recommended substitution found its way into legislation proposed by the Ontario government,
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transaction. It is not triggered by other types of transactions that may
pass effective control, such as a partial bid made to all stockholders, or a
bid made on the TSE.123 But the most striking contrast is not among the
treatments of various transactions within the Ontario statute, but be-
tween Ontario and the United States. In the United States, persons buy-
ing and selling shares are under no general obligation to structure the
transaction to create an equal sharing of any control premium among all
shareholders. The Ontario approach, on the other hand, results in a
more integrated treatment of separate transactions that may shift control
in the target company because it requires acquisitions that would give the
purchaser a sizeable (i.e., twenty percent) holding to be made through a
general all-holders offer. It further achieves equal treatment of target
stockholders if the transaction that shifts control results from purchases
from a few, presumably large, stockholders.
The buyout obligation created by the Ontario statute also contrasts
with the considerably broader buyout obligation imposed by the City
Code in Britain.1 24 The City Code has a higher trigger point (thirty per-
cent rather than twenty percent), but it is applicable to all acquisitions
giving the acquiror thirty percent voting control.
One possible explanation for the narrower focus of the buyout obliga-
tion in Ontario is the relatively large number of Canadian companies
controlled by a small number of family-identified groups.1 25 Permitting
control premiums to be paid to a small number of stockholders may seem
especially unfair when, as seems likely in Canada, the vendors are repeat
players receiving premiums in many such transactions. Although no
other Canadian province has followed Ontario's lead in imposing a
buyout obligation in the context of private sales of control, the Quebec
securities legislation regulates such transactions in a style that is consis-
tent with the concern for apparent fairness described above. Under the
see Bill 159, an Act to amend the Securities Act, 32nd Legis., 4th Sess., (Ontario), 33 Eliz. 11 (1984),
but did not go past its first reading due to a change in governments.
123. The current version of the Ontario statute was adopted following a 1973 study of the law
pertinent to mergers. A majority of the study committee supported the retention of the exemption
for private agreements from regulation as takeover bids and opposed any mandatory buy-out re-
quirement. A minority of the committee supported the imposition of a buyout requirement when a
person became the owner of 20% of the shares through a private agreement. See 1973 REPORT ON
MERGERS, AMALGAMATIONS AND CERTAIN RELATED MATTERS BY SELECT COMMITTEE ON
COMPANY LAW, 29th Legis., 3rd Sess., 22 Eliz. 11 (1973). See generally Leclerc, The Sale of Control
and the Ontario Follow-Up Offer, 23 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT, No. 1, at 35 (1982).
124. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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Quebec statute, the exemption from the general obligation to make an
all-holders bid if the acquiror would thereby obtain more than twenty
percent of a class of voting securities is available only for purchases from
fourteen or fewer holders, at a price not in excess of fifteen percent over
the average market price.' 26 The Quebec solution, then, is to require a
general offer to all shareholders if a premium of more than fifteen percent
would otherwise be paid to more than fourteen vendors.
Industry practice prior to the adoption of the Ontario requirement in
1981 also helps to explain its structure. Based on the TSE's records, an
announcement of an offer to buy out the other shareholders accompanied
traceable private agreement transactions in all but one instance. A ma-
jority of these offers were identical to the consideration in the private
agreement. The remainder offered substantial, if not comparable, consid-
eration. The one exception-where no offer to the remaining sharehold-
ers was made-met with negative reactions in the securities industry and
the financial media and is thought to have added impetus for the adop-
tion of the legal buyout requirement. 127 Thus, the buyout requirement in
Ontario, although narrowly focused, is consistent with the financial com-
munity's private mores that preceded it.
Another facet of takeover regulation in Ontario that differs substan-
tially from the United States is the statutory treatment of conditions in
bids. Under the Ontario Securities Act, but not the Williams Act, the
offeror's ability to condition its bid is limited to three types of conditions
specified in the statute: 1) that a minimum number of shares be tendered;
2) that no material change in the target occur other than changes caused
by the offeror; and 3) that all required governmental approvals be forth-
coming. 2 8 In contrast, Britain's City Code as described above, rather
than specifying permissible conditions, prohibits conditions in which ful-
fillment turns on the offeror itself or its subjective judgment.129 Finally,
the Ontario legislation grants more limited withdrawal rights than does
the Williams Act.'
30
The legal position of target management in Canadian corporations also
126. See The Securities Act, 1982 Que. Stat. ch. 48, § 116(1) (1982). This section of the statute
limits the private purchase exemption to bids made "at a price limited to the margin established by
regulation .... The price limit has been set by regulation at 15% over the average closing quotation
over the ten trading days preceding the bid. Que. Sec. Act. Regulations § 187.
127. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY COMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 12, at 32.
128. See The Securities Act, ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 466, § 89(1)12.
129. See supra text accompanying note 88.
130. The Ontario statute permits shareholders to withdraw shares within the first ten days after
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shows the influence of British and United States law. Like the Williams
Act in the United States, the Canadian securities statutes, with one ex-
ception, do not directly regulate defensive transactions. The constraints
on target management as a result stem from statutory company law and
common law interpretations of the fiduciary obligations owed to the
company by its management. A basic limitation on directors' positions is
the same as that established in Britain: under Canadian corporation stat-
utes directors are always removable through a shareholder vote by ordi-
nary resolution, subject to the protection of cumulative voting rights.131
On the other hand, the Canada Business Corporations Act does not re-
quire a corporation to stipulate in its articles any authorized capital.' 32
Thus, directors of CBCA corporations that have not specified an author-
ized capital are free to allot additional shares.1
33
The one limitation in Canadian securities regulation that affects defen-
sive transactions concerns the regulation of issuer bids (in the U.S. par-
lance, "self-tenders") and, specifically, an issuer's ability to make an offer
to repurchase its own shares that excludes specified stockholders-in
particular a hostile bidder. In the United States, courts have held that a
selective or discriminatory issuer tender offer does not violate the Wil-
liams Act 134 and that target directors, having authorized such an offer,
the bid is made but does not grant additional withdrawal rights if a competing bid is made. See The
Securities Act, ONT. RE-v. STAT. ch. 466, § 89(1), 4; 2 V. ALBOINI, supra note 121, at 19-57 (1984).
131. See, eg., Ontario Business Corporations Act, § 122(1), ONT. STAT. (Ch. 4, 1982). Direc-
tors elected exclusively by a class or series of shares are removable only by an ordinary resolution
passed by holders of that class or series. Id.
One question about removal of directors in Canada is whether directors can be protected against
that risk by holding shares with a weighted voting feature triggered solely by a resolution for re-
moval, a possibility validated under the British Companies Act, 1948 in Bushell v. Faith. See supra
note 111. A possible limitation is § 22(3) of the Ontario corporation statute, which provides that,
where a corporation has only one class of shares, "rights of holders thereof are equal in all respects
and include the rights, (a) to vote at all meetings, .... " The Ontario statute also permits articles to
authorize the creation of shares in classes or series and to authorize directors to fix their number,
rights and attendant restrictions. See Ontario Business Corporations Act § 25(1), ONT. STAT. (Ch.
4, 1982). Further, CBCA § 6(4) specifies that a corporation's articles cannot require a greater
number of shareholder votes to remove a director than would be required for an ordinary resolution.
The Canadian literature recommends other techniques for insulating directors against the risk of
removal. One Canadian authority mentions corporate cross-ownership of shares as a way to protect
directors against removal by shareholders. See Iacobucci, Planning and Implementing Defenses to
Take-over Bids: The Directors' Role, 5 CAN. Bus. L.J. 131, 143 n.39 (1981). The same authority
also mentions the limitation of shareholders to a maximum vote regardless of the number of shares
held. Id. at 149.
132. See Canada Business Corporations Act, 1975 CAN. STAT. ch. 33, § 6(l)(c).
133. This aspect of the CBCA has been criticized. See Iacobucci, supra note 131, at 147.
134. See Unocal Corp. v. Pickens, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,296
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may be protected by the business judgment rule. '35 If the target is able to
exclude shares held by a hostile bidder from its offer, the cost of making
its self-tender offer is reduced for the target, while the hostile bidder,
after the self-tender, holds shares in a target corporation with fewer liq-
uid assets or more debt (incurred in order to finance the self-tender) or
both. In contrast, this technique is not available to targets under the
Ontario securities statute. That statute requires that all takeover bids,
including issuer bids, "be sent to all holders of the class of securities
sought.... ," 16 True, the statute does not expressly require that the offer
be made to all holders, but the "sending" requirement seems substan-
tially the same. The SEC, in the United States, recently used its rule-
making power to prohibit selective issuer and third party offers.137
Directors of Canadian corporations, like their counterparts in Britain
and the United States, hold their powers-including the power to repur-
chase shares and the power to allot additional shares-subject to the fi-
duciary obligation to exercise them only in what the directors bona fide
consider to be the company's best interests. In the leading (and widely
cited) Canadian case, Teck Corporation Ltd. v. Millar,138 the British Co-
lumbia Supreme Court rejected the principle of Hogg v. Cramphorn,
holding that "the directors ought to be allowed to consider who is seek-
ing control and why ... the exercise of their powers to defeat those
seeking a majority will not necessarily be categorized as improper" if the
directors believe substantial damage to the company's interests would
otherwise ensue.'39 In Teck Corporation, the directors of a mining corpo-
ration with an unexploited copper property signed an exploitation con-
tract with a major mining company giving it the right to a thirty percent
equity position in the company owning the copper mine. The effect of
(C.D. Cal. May 1, 1985) (denying motion for preliminary injunction against completion of self-
tender offer with exclusionary condition).
135. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
136. The Securities Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 466, § 89(1)1.
137. See Rule 14d-10, 51 Fed. Reg. 15874 (1986) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.14-1-14d-10;
and Rule 13e-4, 51 Fed. Reg. 15874 (1986) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-4).
138. 33 D.L.R. 3d 288 (1972).
139. Id. at 315. This language should recall that of Vice Chancellor Megarry in Cayne v. Global
Natural Resources P.L.C., see supra text accompanying note 105. The connection is that the Vice
Chancellor's opinion in Cayne cites Teck Corporation as support for its proposed limitation of Hogg
v. Cramphorn. To a reader in the United States, a striking feature of this entire body of cases is the
endurance of the British commonwealth in complementary and cross-citing legal authorities, in an
era in which the commonwealth as a trading union has weakened, and its perpetuation in formal
sovereignty relationships has been vitiated as well.
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the prospective share allotment would have been to reduce below a legal
majority the shareholdings of another mining conglomerate that had,
prior to the signing of the exploitation contract, acquired a majority
shareholding in the company with the copper property, with the ex-
pressed intention of contracting to exploit the mine. The court believed
the target's directors were motivated by a desire to make the best con-
tract for exploitation that they could for their company. The court then
noted that the directors had considered the respective experience and
success in the mining industry of the two contestants for control and had
chosen the one they believed most likely to develop the property effi-
ciently and profitably. 14° Indeed, this view of the directors' motivation
enabled the court to distinguish Hogg v. Cramphorn as applying to facts
in which the directors' primary purpose was to frustrate a takeover
rather than, as in Teck Corporation, to make the best possible deal for
their company. The Teck Corporation court also explicitly rejected the
position stated in Hogg v. Cramphorn that directors' powers may not be
used to frustrate an attempt to take control of the corporation on the
basis that the limitation on directors' power stated in Hogg could not be
limited to share allotments. The relevant criterion according to the Teck
Corporation court, is the directors' purpose and the propriety or impro-
priety of that purpose, which "does not depend on the nature of any
shareholders' rights that may be affected by the exercise of the directors'
powers." 141
Teck Corporation thus represents a view of target directors' actions
that gives primacy to motivation rather than to the Hogg v. Cramphorn
conception of shareholders' "constitutional" rights to acquire voting con-
trol. One palpable difference in result between these two approaches is
the nature of the task imposed on the court that must apply the test to
evaluate the directors' conduct: the test based on motivation adopted in
Teck Corporation requires extensive review of the factual context sur-
rounding the transaction-an exercise that is unnecessary if a case can be
resolved based on conceptions of shareholders' rights as in Hogg. 1
42
Another possible constraint on target directors of Canadian corpora-
140. 33 D.L.R. 3d at 330-31.
141. Id. at 312. But see Coleman v. Myers, [1977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 298 (suggesting that directors owe
a general fiduciary duty to shareholders).
142. A measurable consequence of this difference is the length of judicial opinions applying the
two tests: the court's opinion in Hogg v. Cramphom is 10 pages, whereas in Teck Corporation it is
43 pages!
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tions (albeit one that does not appear to have been used thus far in litiga-
tion over takeovers in Canada) stems from the statutory remedies for
corporate conduct "that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that
unfairly disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director
or officer of the corporation.... 143 The Ontario corporation statute au-
thorizes the court to make an order to rectify such conduct, including
conduct that "threatens to effect" such a result, and broadly defines the
type of orders the court may make. 1" Awaiting further development in
the case law is the distinction, if any, between defensive transactions un-
dertaken for an improper purpose under the test stated in Teck Corpora-
tion and defensive transactions that under the statute are "oppressive or
unfairly prejudicial" or that unfairly disregard the interest of a security
holder. A potential point of tension is between the assumption in Teck
Corporation that directors' duties are owed solely to "the company," and
the assumption in statutory oppression remedies that actions undertaken
by directors on behalf of "the company" may improperly infringe on ob-
ligations owed to shareholders. In any event, a practical constraint on
many target and potential target directors is the requirement of the To-
ronto Stock Exchange that listed companies give the TSE immediate no-
tice of each proposed option or issue of treasury securities. Under its
bylaws, the TSE may require shareholder approval of the transaction as a
condition of accepting the notice. 14 5
D. Australia
Although Australian corporate law and securities regulation is unique
in many respects, the treatment of takeover-related issues somewhat re-
143. See, eg., Ontario Business Corporations Act § 247, Ont. Stat. (Ch. 4, 1982).
144. See id. § 247(3). See generally Kaufman, Oppression Remedies: Recent Developments, in 3
CORPORATE STRUCTURE, FINANCE AND OPERATIONS 67 (L. Sarna ed. 1984); Beck, Minority
Shareholders Rights in the 1980's in SPECIAL LECTURES OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA:
CORPORATE LAW IN THE 80s 311 (1982).
145. Shareholder approval, under the bylaw, may be required if "in the opinion of the Ex-
change" the proposed transaction may materially affect control of the company, or the transaction
has not been negotiated at arm's length, or it "is of such a nature to make shareholder approval
desirable, having regard to the interests of the company's shareholders and the investing public."
TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE, GENERAL BY-LAW § 19.06(2). In contrast, in the United States, the
New York and American stock exchanges have adopted bright-line tests for share allotments that
require shareholder approval. The New York exchange requires shareholder approval for any op-
tion or share allotment that would increase the issuer's outstanding common shares by 18.5%. See
NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-283. The comparable limitation on the American exchange is 20%.
See AMEX COMPANY GUIDE § 7.3.
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sembles other Commonwealth systems and the United States. Corporate
takeovers are regulated by the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act of
1980 ("CASA"), a federal statute adopted by each of the Australian
states. CASA, a much lengthier and much more detailed statute than its
counterpart legislation in the United States and Canada, confers enforce-
ment authority on the National Companies and Securities Commission
("NCSC") and makes applicable all of the remedial provisions in the
Companies Code. CASA also gives the NCSC power to determine that,
in light of the statute's purposes, parties' acquisitions of shares or other
activities are "unacceptable" notwithstanding literal compliance with
CASA itself, and power to apply to a court for orders appropriate to
protect the rights of interests involved. 146 In this respect, the NCSC's
posture under CASA resembles the stated position of the Take-Over
Panel in Britain. The City Code states that the Code's "spirit as well as
the precise wording ... must be observed" by participants in take over
contests. 147
Like the Ontario legislation, CASA in essence defines a closed system
with stated exceptions: under CASA, any acquisition that would give the
acquiring person, together with his associates, twenty percent or more of
the target's voting securities must be made either through a general offer
to all shareholders or through a regulated stock exchange bid. 48 None-
theless, at least in some circumstances litigation has tested and found
wanting the NCSC's powers to compel an offeror to proceed with an
offer. 149 Significant exceptions for our purposes from the general bid re-
quirement created by CASA are: 1) acquisitions of shares in a company
that has fewer than fifteen shareholders, 50 and 2) acquisitions that have
been approved at a shareholders' meeting by a majority of the target's
shares, excluding from the vote shares held by the prospective acquiror
and its associates. 51
146. See Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act 1980, AUSTL. C. AcT § 60 (Supp. 1978-83)
[hereinafter CASA].
147. See CITY CODE, supra note 84, General Principles, Introduction.
148. See CASA, supra note 146, at § 11. For a discussion of the definitional sections of CASA,
see Deutsch, Takeovers and the Scope of the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) (N.S. W.) Code, 11
AusTL. Bus. L.J. 205 (1983).
149. In N.C.S.C. v. Indus. Equity Ltd., [1982] 1 A.C.L.C. (Sup. Ct. N.S.W.), the court held that
the N.C.S.C. lacked statutory power to compel an offeror to proceed with an offer, in very compli-
cated circumstances involving, inter alia, an arguable breach of CASA § 11.
150. See CASA, supra note 146, at § 13(1). This exception is inapplicable if the exempt acquisi-
tion would contravene § 11 with regard to the shares of another company.
151. See id. § 12(g).
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Like the Ontario statute CASA contemplates the possibility of tender
offers made through a stock exchange, but CASA, unlike the Ontario
statute, regulates such offers in great detail. CASA restricts in some as-
pects an offeror's ability to condition its bid.152 CASA does not require a
follow-up bid and regulates partial offers by requiring that they be made
on a proportional basis.153 Thus, in contrast to the Williams Act in the
United States, but paralleling the Ontario Securities Act, CASA requires
that sizeable share acquisitions, or at least those giving the acquiring per-
son twenty percent of the target's voting power, be made through a gen-
eral offer to all shareholders. In contrast to the Ontario legislation and
the City Code in Britain, CASA does not treat such sizeable acquisitions
as events triggering an obligation on the part of the acquiring share-
holder to offer to buy out the target's remaining shares. In this respect,
the operative norm of equity in CASA is an equality of opportunity
rather than equality of treatment. Finally, unlike all the other regulatory
systems, CASA grants no withdrawal rights to shareholders.154
152. CASA, although it defines in § 6 a set of conditioning events or "prescribed occurrences"
concerning the target, can be read not to limit the offeror to those specified conditions. See H. FORD,
COMPANY LAW 520 (3d ed. 1982). CASA also forecloses the offeror's ability to make market
purchases during the bid if the offer is subject to conditions other than those specified in § 13(4)(b),
which are the "prescribed occurrences" for the target, minimum acceptable conditions and any other
conditions approved by the commission. The "prescribed occurrences" include a number of events
that would reduce the value of the target's assets or increase the number of target shares outstand-
ing. The N.C.S.C. has issued a general policy statement concerning conditions in bids that acknowl-
edges that the scope of§ 13(3) & (4) is limited to circumstances in which the offeror desires to assert
additional conditions and buy on the market. See N.C.S.C. Policy Statement, approval of conditions
Release No. 107 (1985).
153. See CASA, supra note 146, at §§ 16(2)(a), 16(s)(f)(iii). The regulation of partial bids has
recently been under discussion in Australia, at least in part because 40% of recent offers have been
partial bids. The Ministerial Council adopted the recommendations of the Companies and Securities
Law Review Committee that bidders making partial offers be required to make them on a propor-
tional rather than a prorated basis. See CASA, supra note 146, §§ 16(2)(a), 16(2)(f)(iii); see gener-
ally COMPANIES AND SECURITIES LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE MINISTERIAL
COUNCIL ON PARTIAL TAKEOVER BIDS (August 1985). The statute was further amended in 1986 to
permit a company, in its constituent documents (i.e., its articles), to require that any partial bid for
its shares be subject to approval or disapproval by a shareholder plebiscite. See CASA, supra note
146, § 3 IA. But the stock exchanges have threatened to delist companies that adopt these plebiscite
provisions, despite statutory language providing for plebiscites "not withstanding anything in the
business or listing rules of the exchange." See Potter, Plebiscite Stance likely this week, Aust. Fin.
Rev., Oct. 1, 1986, at 27, col. 1. Nonetheless, the exchanges were reported to be unlikely to confront
their largest listed company (BHP) over its adoption of a plebiscite requirement for partial bids. See
The Age, Oct. 1, 1986, at 29, col. 4.
154. Whether the absence of withdrawal rights in itself inhibits the appearance of competing bids
is an open question. At least some Australian observers believe that their absence means only that
shareholders wait until the proverbial last moment in order to tender, awaiting until the very end of
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An additional aspect of the corporate legal context in Australia that
defines the acquisition environment is the lack in the Australian corpo-
rate statutes of any provisions readily enabling negotiated corporate
mergers or amalgamations. Thus, in contrast to Canada and the United
States, but like Britain, 155 Australia makes effecting a negotiated merger
between two companies difficult to achieve through the mechanisms set
forth in the corporation statute itself, a fact that must be relevant to the
popularity of the device of the takeover bid.1 16 Finally, unlike the Wil-
liams Act and the Ontario securities legislation, CASA requires that the
offer document be registered with the Securities Commission prior to its
transmission to offeree shareholders, even if the consideration offered in
the bid is exclusively cash."17
The powers of target company directors in Australia are, on balance,
more limited by aspects of Australian statutory corporate law than are
their counterparts' powers under the other corporation statutes reviewed
in this Article. Greater similarity obtains for the fiduciary constraints
upon directors' exercise of those powers.
Under the Australian Companies Code, a corporation's directors are
any bid's duration the appearance of a competing bid. Other observers differ. See Coffee, supra note
46, at 233-34. A separate-and separable-question is the significance of additional withdrawal rights
specifically triggered by the appearance of a competing bid. Such rights are created in the United
States by the SEC's Rule 14d-7(a)(2) under the Williams Act. 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-7(a)(2). They not
only permit shareholders to withdraw, they prolong the contest and enhance the prospect of succes-
sive bid topping. Additionally, CASA § 31 provides that if the offeror makes purchases outside the
bid at a higher price, the terms of the bid shall be deemed to be varied to offer the higher price.
155. For a discussion of the British materials, see text accompanying note 113 supra. The Onta-
rio statute authorizes corporations to amalgamate, on the basis of an agreement entered into by each
corporation. The amalgamation agreements must then be submitted to a shareholder meeting by the
directors of each corporation and approved by special resolution of the holders of each class or series
entitled to vote thereon. Ontario Business Corporations Act §§ 174-75, Ont. Stat. (Ch. 4, 1982).
"Special resolutions" under this statute require a 2/3 majority vote to pass. Id. at § 1(43).
156. Under the Australian Companies Code, a "compromise or arrangement" requires court
approval and approval by 75% of the shareholders or class of shareholders if the "arrangement" is
with only one class. Companies Code, 1981, AUSTL. C. AcTs § 315 (Supp. 1978-83). The "compro-
mise or arrangement" section includes reconstructions or amalgamations with another company and
requires court approval for all such transactions. Id. at § 317.
157. See CASA, supra note 146, § 16(2)(e). In the United States, prior registration with the SEC
would be required if the consideration being offered is securities, for then the registration and pro-
spectus requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 would be implicated. Otherwise, no registration
requirement applies io tender offers. In Ontario, although it is customary to file take-over circulars
with the OSC on the same day they are dispatched to offerees, see 2 V. Alboini, supra note 121, at 19-
105, and although prospectus-type disclosure is required if the consideration offered by the bid is
securities, see id. at 19-104, registration is not required and the OSC will review the contents of the
bid circular only under very narrow circumstances, see id. at 19-8.
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removable by ordinary resolution "notwithstanding anything in its arti-
cles or in any agreement... ."158 Whether this language is sufficient to
exclude the possibility of protecting directors against removal through
removal-triggered weighted voting shares appears to be an open question
under the Australian statute, although, as we have seen, the validity of
such voting rights has been upheld in the face of similar language in the
British Companies Act. 59 An additional limitation stems from the abso-
lute statutory prohibition on corporate share repurchases, which are a
crime in Australia."6 Until recently, Britain also prohibited corporate
share repurchases. Australian statutes permit companies to lend finan-
cial assistance to others purchasing their shares only if three-fourths of
the shareholders vote by special resolution to approve the transaction. 161
In contrast, in Britain, although such assistance is prohibited, a company
may justify giving lending financial assistance if its primary purpose is
incidental to some larger purpose of the company itself. Together, these
two aspects of Australian company law preclude defensive share repur-
chases and issuer tender offers, while subjecting to shareholder ap-
proval-at a high threshold--defensive transactions in which the target
enlists the support of a favored bidder by permitting the use of its assets
and earnings to repay the favored bidder's financing for its offer. The
basic position in Australia, then, would be that defensive use of the lever-
aged buyout transaction is not an option.
But Australian securities professionals are easily as adept 162 as their
158. See Companies Code, 1981, supra note 157, at § 225 (1981).
159. See supra text accompanying note 111.
160. See Companies Code, 1981, supra note 157, at § 129(l)(b) & (5). Until relatively recently,
the British Companies Acts contained the same prohibition, apparently grounded in the view that
the company's capitalization in common stock represents an ongoing and irreducible representation
to its creditors. In Britain, the Companies Act, 1981 permitted an issuer to repurchase its own
shares if procedures set forth in the statute were followed, subject to shareholder approval of the
transaction by ordinary resolution. See Companies Act, 1981 §§ 46-49. The Companies Act, 1985
carries over these provisions. See Companies Act, 1985 §§ 162-69.
161. See Companies Code, 1981, supra note 157, at § 129(10)(a) (1981). In Britain, the Compa-
nies Act, 1981, likewise prohibited companies from lending financial assistance for the purchase of
their own shares, but transactions were excepted from the prohibition if the company's "principal
purpose" in giving the assistance was not to give it for the purpose of the acquisition but as an
incidental part of some larger purpose of the company, and if the assistance was given in good faith
in the company's interests. Companies Act, 1981, supra note 157, at § 42(1), (3). The bar on finan-
cial assistance was also not violated by a company's repurchase of its own shares. Id. § 42(5)(g).
These rules are now part of the Companies Act, 1985 §§ 151-53.
162. The greater complexity of the relevant Australian statutes suggests, if anything, a higher
degree of cleverness.
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brothers and sisters elsewhere, and at least two caveats to the basic posi-
tion must be noted. First, the statute itself exempts from its strictures
"the payment of a dividend by a company in good faith and in the ordi-
nary course of commercial dealing." This suggests one route through
which reserves could be drawn out of the target and into the coffers of an
acquiring party.1 63 Second, if a bidder initially, based on its own financ-
ing, buys shares in the target and then sells them to an entity favored by
the target's management to become the company's new controlling
shareholder, it is not unimaginable that the target's assets might ulti-
mately be used to repay the "moral debt" owed to the initial bidder.
The fiduciary constraints on Australian directors' exercise of their cor-
porate powers developed in the Commonwealth legal context shared with
Britain and Canada. In Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd., 6
an appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales to the Judicial
Committee,165 the directors of a target company had issued a large block
of shares to a preferred bidder. This destroyed the majority position of
the rival bidder, which had made a bid for the remaining shares in the
company that its directors considered too low and that was ultimately
topped by a higher bid from the preferred bidder (and recipient of the
163. See Companies Code, 1981, supra note 157, at § 129(8)(a). Indeed, the Australian litera-
ture expressly discusses the dividend route as a way to decrease the acquiring party's costs. See
Gonski & Keenan, supra note 93, at 232. On the other hand, if the acquisition were made through a
partial bid, so that dividend payments must be made to other shareholders in addition to the bidder,
the target's assets will be reduced by a greater proportion than the reduction in the offeror's effective
costs-a phenomenon termed "leakage" of assets. Id.
164. [1974] A.C. 821 (P.C.).
165. In 1975, Australia abolished the right of appeal to Privy Council from judgments of its
High Court; likewise, there is no appeal as of right from judgments of the state supreme courts to the
High Court. In consequence, the number of appeals brought to Privy Council from the supreme
courts has increased. In effect, since 1975 there have been two courts of ultimate appeal from judg-
ments of the supreme courts. This has led in some instances to conflicting precedents binding on a
state's supreme court. Some Australian litigants apparently find it cheaper-or for other reasons
preferable-to appeal from judgments of single state supreme court judges to Privy Council than to
appeal to the full supreme court and then seek special leave to appeal to the High Court, and some
litigants institute appeals to Privy Council at the same time as applying for special leave to appeal to
the High Court. See Gibbs, The State of the Judicature, 59 L. INST. J. 968, 970 (1985). Indeed, one
Australian judge has observed that "the law of New South Wales is growing relatively more quickly
in London than in Canberra." Id. But this situation will not continue indefinitely: agreement has
been reached among the Australian Commonwealth, the States and British authorities to abolish the
remaining right of appeal to Privy Council. Id. Former Chief Justice Gibbs of Australia's High
Court, although acknowledging with regret the impending rupture of the tie between British and
Australian lawyers, nonetheless emphasizes "the urgency of the need to close this chapter in our
judicial history." Id.
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share allotment).166 The Judicial Committee held that it was improper
for the directors to use their power to allot shares purely for the purpose
of destroying an existing majority or creating a new majority, because by
doing so the directors "interfered with that element of the company's
constitution which is separate from and set against their powers... "
namely the individual shareholders' right to dispose of shares at a given
price. 6 7 While Howard Smith explicitly rejects the argument that the
dispute must be decided in favor of the corporation's directors once it is
shown they were not motivated by self-interest, 168 it also rejects the argu-
ment that the only proper purpose for which shares could be issued is to
raise fresh capital, stating that the power should not be understood to be
so narrowly limited.16
9
Curiously enough, after discussing the opinion in Teck Corporation
and the Canadian court's conclusion that the share allotment in that case
was proper because its primary purpose was to obtain the best possible
deal for the company, the Howard Smith opinion concludes that Teck
Corporation "appears to be in line with the English and Australian au-
thorities to which reference has been made." ' But one English author-
ity to which Howard Smith refers is Hogg v. Cramphorn, whose rationale
was specifically rejected by the British Columbia Supreme Court in Teck
Corporation.7' Further, although the transactional contexts in Teck
Corporation and Howard Smith were different (for one thing, the bidding
battle in Teck was in part over the bidders' respective abilities to develop
the target company's copper mine), they are not so utterly dissimilar to
reconcile the cases' rationales. 7 2
The current strength of the legacy of Howard Smith is difficult to as-
sess. Although the case has not been overruled, one recent Australian
166. [1974] App. Cas. at 823-24.
167. Id. at 837. In an earlier Australian case, Mills v. Mills, 60 C.L.R. 150, 185-6 (Austl. 1938)
the emphasis of the court's analysis is instead on the substantial object the company's directors
sought to achieve.
168. [1974] App. Cas. at 834.
169. Id. at 835.
170. Id.
171. It may nonetheless be too much to state that Howard Smith thereby takes the position that
Hogg v. Cramphorn was wrong, see Lazarides, supra note 108, at 78, because the treatment of Teck
Corporation in Howard Smith is simply too brief to support such a strong reading.
172. To be sure, the judgment reviewed by the Judicial Committee in Howard Smith contained a
specific finding that, assuming the target company to be in need of raising more capital, issuing
debentures rather than shares would have been more appropriate for it. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. v.
R.W. Miller (Holdings) Ltds., [1972] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 850, 872.
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case appears to depart somewhat from its reasoning. In Pine Vale Invest-
ments Ltd. v. McDonnell and East Ltd. and Anor,73 Pine Vale controlled
about twenty-six percent of the shares in McDonnell and East, and had
announced a partial takeover bid for McDonnell. Pine Vale, however,
had not made a formal offer when McDonnell and East, to finance the
acquisition of another business, proposed to issue rights to buy additional
McDonnell shares to all of its shareholders. The effect of the proposed
rights issue on Pine Vale would be to increase its cost in making a take-
over offer for McDonnell and East, because more shares would be out-
standing if the rights were exercised by other shareholders, as well as to
increase the value of McDonnell and East's assets. The court rejected
Pine Vale's application for an injunction, finding that McDonnell's direc-
tors were genuinely convinced their acquisition was in the company's
best commercial interests and that the proposed transactions by McDon-
nell were not disadvantageous to the shareholders as a whole. Although
the court thought it relevant that these transactions occurred at the time
of Pine Vale's proposed takeover, it held this coincidence was not neces-
sarily fatal to the legal position of the target's directors. In the court's
view, the directors' duties were owed to the company as a whole and not
to individual shareholders, and no individual shareholder could be
shown to be discriminated against by the proposed transactions. The dif-
ference between Pine Vale and Howard Smith is in part that these opin-
ions emphasize different things: the perceived commercial logic of the
target's proposed transaction rather than the rights of the shareholders
and prospective offeror. This in turn suggests a willingness in Australian
courts to consider target directors' statements of business justification
and purpose in the takeover context for transactions that also have a
defensive effect. Nonetheless, no Australian case to date has legitimated
directors' use of their power to defend against a hostile bid based simply
on their judgment that the bidder's prospective control would be bad for
the company.
CASA and the rules of the AASE also regulate the defensive use of
share allotments. CASA requires shareholder approval to exempt from
the requirement that a general "all-holders" bid be made, any issuance of
shares to a party who thereby becomes the holder of twenty percent or
more of the issuer's voting securities.' 74 Thus, if a target's directors seek
to place a block of shares with a likely ally in the event a hostile offer is
173. (1983) 8 A.C.L.R. 19, 1 A.C.L.C. 1294 (Sup. Ct. Queens).
174. See CASA, supra note 146, at § 12(g).
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made, or if they seek to entice a friendly offeror into a bidding contest by
issuing it a sizable block of shares, the issuer's shareholders must vote to
approve the transaction if the transferee of the shares would, as a result,
hold twenty percent or more of the issuer's voting securities. 175 The
rules of Australian stock exchanges also require shareholder approval for
any additional allotment of shares other than on a proportional basis to
existing shareholders, once directors of the issuer have received notice of
an actual or potential offer and for three months thereafter.
176
The significance of the AASE requirement must, however, be assessed
in light of the actual transactional environment in Australia in which
many partial bids are made. CASA does not require shareholder ap-
proval for allotments of less than twenty percent and the AASE rule does
not require shareholder approval for the additional allotment if it is made
pari passu to all present shareholders. Either an allotment of less than
twenty percent or a pari passu allotment to present shareholders can se-
verely disrupt the arithmetic of a partial bidder. As an example, the
rights issue in Pine Vale offered 1.5 million shares to McDonnell's share-
holders at three dollars per share; the unwelcome bid was for 500,000
shares at six dollars each. The court believed it "wholly impossible" that
the bidder would persist with its offer.'
7 7
A few additional legal constraints on Australian targets are notewor-
thy. CASA permits the Supreme Court to void agreements for compen-
sation for loss of office entered into by the target with its officers or
directors in contemplation of a takeover, unless the agreements are ap-
proved by a shareholder vote in general meeting at which the benefi-
ciaries do not vote for the resolution. 178 Finally, the NCSC has taken the
position that its power under CASA to declare conduct unacceptable
could embrace declarations concerning defensive transactions. This
would include a target's declaration of an unusual dividend in the course
175. In contrast, the Ontario statute, although it bears certain structural similarities to CASA,
does not seem to require that a defensive placement of shares be interpreted as a "takeover bid" to
which the requirement of a general all-holders offer would be applicable. Even though § 88(l)(k)(ii)
of the Ontario statute defines "take-over bid" to include acceptances of offers to sell, the statute also
excepts in § 88(2)(c) offers to purchase through agreements with fewer than fifteen security holders.
See The Securities Act, ONT. REv. STAT. Ch. 466, § 88(l)(k)(ii), (2)(c). See also 2 V. ALBOINI,
supra note 121, at § 19.2.11 (1982) ("take-over bid" interpreted not to encompass purchase of treas-
ury shares from issuer); id. § 19.1.11 (general discussion of available defensive tactics including share
allotments to friendly parties).
176. AASE OFFICIAL LIsT REQUIREMENT § 3R(3).
177. See (1983) 8 A.C.L.R. at 208.
178. CASA, supra note 146, at § 50.
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of a takeover bid.179 Taken together, and contrasted with Canada and
the United States, all of these provisions restrict the ability of target di-
rectors in Australia to defend against unwelcome takeover bids. Again,
however, the ingenuity of their advisors is considerable. For example,
convertible notes issued to friendly parties appear to be used with in-
creased frequency as defensive measures, with indentures structured to
include a clause making the notes convertible into common shares during
a takeover of the issuer.18 0 On the other hand, the securities bar is re-
ported to have had difficulty in developing "shark repellant" language for
articles amendments that would be acceptable to an Australian stock
exchange. 181
IV. TECHNICAL ISSUES
This section of the Article explores three more technical questions
about the regulation of takeovers that are currently at issue in some, if
not all, of the regulatory systems discussed and contrasts each system's
resolution of these questions. These issues are: 1) transactions prior to,
or contemporaneous with, or instead of, a formal takeover bid; 2) the
treatment of equity securities with lesser voting rights in takeover trans-
actions; and 3) difficulties in the implementation of mandatory offers.
A. Non-Bid Transactions
One question raised by each of the regulatory systems discussed in this
Article is the extent to which the system requires an integrated treatment
of a series of separate transactions that cumulatively may have the effect
of shifting control of a company. In the absence of such a requirement, a
prospective acquiror may move quickly, and perhaps anonymously as
well, through stock exchange and private transactions to accumulate
shares at prices not available to shareholders other than the vendors in
those transactions. Different dimensions of this underlying question arise
in the United States, Canada and Australia.
In this connection the only current constraint in the United States on
offerors is a prohibition on purchasing shares other than through the of-
fer itself once a tender offer has been announced and while the offer is
179. See H. FORD, supra note 152, at 536.
180. See O'Bryan, New Court Requirements Can Make Takeovers "Absurdly Complex," 59 LAW
INST. J. 74, 75 (1985).
181. See Gonski & Keenan, supra note 93, at 253 n.43.
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outstanding. Otherwise, the offeror is free to precede or follow a tender
offer with share acquisitions-whether through private purchases or
stock exchange transactions-at a price or for a consideration different
from that of the general tender offer. Partial offers are not discouraged
and, apart from the proration requirement described above, are not sub-
ject to special regulatory treatment. Indeed, a controlling position may
be acquired in the United States without making any general offer to
stockholders. Although federal courts in a few cases have been willing to
characterize selective purchasing campaigns that resulted in acquisitions
of substantial blocks of shares as "tender offers" to which the Williams
Act applied, most cases and all recent cases have declined to so interpret
the reach of the statute.18 2 In effect, current law in the United States
takes an atomistic view of formally separate transactions that cumula-
tively may shift control, so long as a formal tender offer is not made to
the target's shareholders.
The atomistic view ascribed above to the United States is not shared by
the other systems reviewed by this Article. In Canada and Australia,
problems of linking or integrating transactions may arise. For example,
under the Ontario statute, although an acquisition of shares that would
give the acquiring person control of twenty percent or more of the tar-
get's stock must be made as an all-holders bid, pre-bid purchases up to
the twenty percent threshold are freely permitted, in theory. Other as-
pects of the Ontario regulatory system, however, require that this theo-
retical possibility be modified somewhat. First, it will be recalled that the
Ontario statute requires a take-out bid to the remaining shareholders if
the acquiror attains control of twenty percent or more of the target's
voting rights through a private transaction in which a premium of more
than fifteen percent over market was paid. If pre-bid market purchases
are followed by pre-bid private transactions, the target's shareholders or
the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) staff may argue that the mar-
ket purchases raised the market price, so that the price paid in the private
transaction exceeded the allowable premium and triggered an obligation
to make a follow-up bid."8 3 Second, the OSC has taken the position that
if an acquiror offers to purchase all the securities of one owner, any
182. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1985); Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in relevant part, 584 F.2d
1195, 1206-07 (2d Cir. 1978); S.E.C. v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 949-53 (9th
Cir. 1985).
183. See Coleman, supra note 43, at 176.
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"linked" or "related" takeover bid must be at a price at least as great as
that offered in the private agreement. 184 That is, if the all-holders bid is
"linked" to the private agreement, even if the private agreement does not
trigger a buyout obligation, the purchaser has an obligation to offer an
equal price to all holders of the same class of security. The rationale for
this position is the statutory requirement that all holders be offered the
same consideration.185 Whether the takeover bid can be shown to be
"linked" to the private purchase depends on proof of the purchaser's in-
tention at the time of the private purchase. Relatedly, the OSC does not
permit private purchase agreements by offerors during the course of a
takeover bid.186
The Australian dimension of this problem has arisen because CASA,
although it does not impose any obligation to make a follow-up bid, re-
quires acquisitions that will give the purchaser twenty percent voting
control of the target to be made through a bid to all shareholders or
through a regulated stock exchange bid. In one case before the NCSC,
Company A owned 49.9% of the shares of Company B. Another com-
pany, C, entered into an agreement to buy 19.5% of the B shares held by
a subsidiary of.A (A's remaining shares of B were held by another subsid-
iary). This agreement was conditional on C acquiring 48% of B's shares
(or 28.5% beyond those covered by the agreement itself). C made an
offer to B's remaining shareholders at A$.75/share; the shares' market
price, which had been in the A$.80 range, jumped to A$1.01/share. A,
however, had an incentive to tender because the aggregate price it would
receive through the negotiated transaction and acceptance of the public
offer amounted to about A$40 million or A$1.50/share. Thus, A would
receive considerably more value per share for its holdings of B than B's
public shareholders. The NCSC alleged before the Supreme Court of
New South Wales that this combination of agreements violated CASA.
The court adjourned the proceeding pending a meeting of B's sharehold-
184. Ontario Securities Commission, Policy 9.3(B)(2) & (3). Relatedly, the City Code prevents
an officer and persons acting in concert from buying shares at prices higher than those in the offer
without revising the offer price upward. In Regina v. Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, [1987] 2
W.L.R. 699, the Court of Appeal held that the Panel's determinations as to the composition of a
concert party could be the object of judicial review.
185. See Ontario Securities Act, ONT. REV. STAT. Ch. 466, § 91(3).
186. Notice, Consensus on Amendments to Take-Over Bids/Issuer Bid Rules I 3(b). Market
purchases, however, are permitted, subject to an obligation to disclose them daily to the Commission
and to any exchange on which the target is listed.
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ers to approve the sale in which A and its associates were not to vote. 18
7
The central concern, under CASA as under the Ontario statute, is that
related transactions not be deployed to deprive public shareholders of a
full share in the benefit of sales of corporate control.
B. Treatment of Inferior Equity Securities
The extent to which differential treatment of security holders (based
on differences in their securities' voting rights) is tolerated varies greatly
in each of these systems. In the United States, the protection of security
holders with lesser voting rights does not seem to have surfaced as a
regulatory concern in the takeover context. The situation in Canada is in
marked contrast. The Ontario Securities Act permits a takeover bid to
be restricted to one class of an issuer's securities and restricts the follow-
up obligation to securities of that class, but no prospectus has been un-
derwritten since 1981 that did not contain protective provisions giving
holders of restricted or special voting shares the benefit of any takeover
bid. 88 In Britain, the City Code has addressed the same problem by
imposing an obligation on the acquiror to make a follow-up offer once
thirty percent voting control is acquired. The City Code requires that
the follow-up bid be made to "the holder of any class of equity security
whether voting or non-voting. ."I" The protection afforded by the City
Code, however, is only applicable once thirty percent voting control is
acquired, and thus is less complete than the protection created by the
conventional Canadian underwriting practice.
In Australia, protection for holders of inferior-grade equity is weaker.
The stock exchange listing requirements formerly required an offeror
who was bidding for all shares in a class to make an offer for shares in
other classes. 190 CASA continues this requirement only in vitiated form,
by providing that an offeror who acquires ninety percent of a company's
voting shares must give notice to all holders of non-voting shares and
convertible shares, 19' who in turn may require the offeror to purchase
their securities.'
92
187. This incident is described in Coleman, supra note 43, at 206.
188. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 12, at 33.
189. See CITY CODE, supra note 84, Rule 9.1.
190. See Gonski & Keenan, supra note 93, at 228.
191. CASA, supra note 146, at § 43(4).
192. Id. at § 43(6).
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C. Mandatory Buyouts-Problems in Implementation
Two of the jurisdictions surveyed in this Article, Ontario and Great
Britain, require purchasers of shares to offer to buy out the corporation's
remaining shareholders under some circumstances. This section of the
Article develops further the differences between the buyout obligations in
Britain and Ontario, focusing primarily on difficulties that have arisen in
the implementation of each.
In Britain, the City Code requires a buyout offer when a person and
those acting in concert with him acquire shares or rights over shares that
represent thirty percent of the voting rights. 93 One practical difficulty
with the administration of this requirement stems from the extension of
the buyout obligation to persons "acting in concert" with the acquiring
person. The applicability of the requirement to "concert parties" (in the
British terminology) means that factual questions can easily arise con-
cerning whether any particular associate of the acquiring person is in-
deed acting in concert to obtain control of a company.194 It further
means that the buyout obligation may ultimately apply to persons who
argue that they were unaware of its applicability to them, including per-
sons who did not themselves acquire any shares.195
A second problem arises from the Code's requirement that the
mandatory offer be in cash or that it contain a cash alternative equal to
the highest price paid by the offeror or its concert party over the preced-
ing twelve months.1 96 The Panel's ability to achieve compliance with the
buyout requirement, however, has been frustrated in situations in which
the acquiring person lacked the cash resources to implement its bidding
193. CrrY CODE, supra note 84, Rule 9.1.
194. "Acting in concert" is defined expansively in the Code to "comprise persons who, pursuant
to an agreement or understanding (whether formal or informal), actively cooperate, through the
acquisition by any of them of shares of a company, to obtain or consolidate control ... of that
company." Id. at B1. "Control" is defined to mean a holding of 30% or more of a company's voting
rights, "irrespective of whether that holding or holdings gives de facto control." Id. at B3. The
Code also obliges directors of the target who sell their shares to a purchaser who incurs a buyout
obligation to "ensure as a condition of the sale that the purchaser undertakes to fulfill his obligations
.. " to make the mandatory offer. Except with the Panel's consent, directors should not resign from
office until the offer closes or becomes unconditional as to acceptances. Id. Rule 9.6. Target direc-
tors who sell to a purchaser that fails to fulfill its buyout obligation nonetheless do not appear under
the Code to be subject to the buyout obligation themselves.
195. Id. Rule 9.2.
196. Id. Rule 9.5.
[Vol. 65:69
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/3
TAKEOVER REGULATION
obligation, 9 7 and persons acting in concert with the acquiror were, for
one reason or another, likewise unable to make a cash bid.198
Somewhat different problems in implementation have arisen for the
buyout obligation imposed by the Ontario Securities Act. A buyout offer
is required by that statute if more than twenty percent of a company's
voting securities are acquired in a private purchase from fourteen or
fewer holders at a price more than fifteen percent above the securities'
average market price for the ten business days preceding the private
purchase. 199 The buyout offer must be for consideration "at least equal
in value" to that paid in the private purchase.2 °°
The statute's definition of the circumstances that trigger the buyout
obligation creates two separate administrative problems for the OSC.
First, because the statute permits the mandatory bid to offer "at least
equal value," the OSC has devoted many hours of hearing time to valua-
tion questions concerning the comparative merits of different packages of
securities.2° ' The necessity for administrative consideration of such
questions is, in contrast, reduced by the City Code in Britain which re-
quires that all mandatory offers be for cash or contain a cash alternative.
Second, the buyout obligation in Ontario is triggered by the payment of a
price under the private agreement that exceeds average market price by
more than fifteen percent. This definition of the trigger event has led the
OSC to scrutinize closely the composition of the reported market price.
For example, the OSC appears to be open to the argument that the re-
ported market price was artificially high because it had been manipulated
and thus that the "true" market price was lower than the reported price
and the purchaser paid a sufficiently high premium over "true market
price" in the private purchase to trigger a buyout obligation.20 2 In con-
trast, the City Code's buyout obligation does not employ a trigger pre-
mised on market price, so the question of credibility of market price does
not arise.
197. See A. JOHNSTON, THE CITY TAKE-OVER CODE 288 (1980) (describing situation in which
purchaser lacked financial resources to make mandatory offer).
198. See id. at 294-95 (South African member of concert party unable to implement his obliga-
tion to make mandatory offer due to difficulties with exchange control. Panel releases him from
obligation but directs him not to buy or sell shares in target or lend stock to principal purchaser, nor
to frustrate any bid for target acceptable to shareholders who would have received mandatory offer).
199. Ontario Securities Act, ONT. REV. STAT. Ch. 466, § 91(1).
200. Id.
201. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.
202. Id.
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The timing of the buyout offer may also create difficulties. Under the
Ontario statute, the offeror has 180 days after the private purchase to
make a follow-up bid. The potential lag of six months may make the
follow-up bid impracticable, due to changes in the market for target
shares or in the offeror's financial position. The length of the lag time
may also call into question whether the target's shareholders are truly
being offered equivalent consideration and whether they should be com-
pensated for the delay by a payment of interest.2 °a In contrast to the
Ontario statute, the City Code does not contain any bright-line test for
timing the follow-up bid. The offeror has an incentive to make the bid
promptly because under the Code, except with the Panel's consent, no
nominee of persons obliged to make a follow-up offer may be appointed
to the board of the offeree company until the mandatory offer document
is posted, nor may the offeror or its concert party exercise votes attaching
to any share in the offeree company until the offer document is posted. 2"
The difffculty with the Ontario requirement that appears most vexa-
tious legally is its potential for extraterritorial application. The Ontario
statute, including the follow-up obligation, applies so long as one share-
holder of the target company has an address in Ontario on the company's
books, even though the target is not incorporated in Ontario and the
purchase triggering the follow-up obligation takes place outside Ontario.
As no other Canadian jurisdiction has chosen to impose a buyout obliga-
tion, Ontario's application of its statute to transactions in shares of com-
panies incorporated in other provinces that are executed outside Ontario
is seen, at least in some circles, as an affront to intra-Canadian comity.205
Problems of this sort are inevitable, however, in federal systems with in-
consistent bodies of state law where no supervening federal statute ap-
plies to the question, and no unanimously assented-to principle clearly
establishes states' relative prerogatives.20 6
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RULES IN SHAPING
TRANSACTIONAL CLIMATE
Thus far, the Article has discussed differences among takeover envi-
203. Id.
204. CITY CODE, supra note 84, Rule 9.7.
205. See Coleman, supra note 43, at 210 (referring disparagingly to "sandbox theory" of OSC).
206. For a discussion of related problems in the United States context, see DeMott, Perspectives
on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal.Affairs, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (Summer 1985);
Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1.
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ronments and among legal (and extra legal) rules regulating takeover
transactions in four countries. Whether these two types of differences are
connected is examined next. This section of the Article identifies four
respects in which takeover environments seem to differ markedly and
traces them, at least in part, to differences among rules governing trans-
actions and rules determining the availability of particular types of
transactions.
A. Hostile Bidders' Success and Failure
The success of hostile bidders in acquiring control of targets seems to
vary among jurisdictions. For example, as Section II illustrates, the
"failure rate" of bidders appears to be higher in the United States than in
Britain. Some of this divergence can be explained by differences among
the rules defining the transactional environment in which the bid is
made. In the United States, target managements are more free than in
Britain to participate aggressively in takeover contests, and, in particular,
they are able to ease the entrance of friendly bidders into the contest,
subject to the constraints of fiduciary duty. Indeed, in the United States
target managers are free to participate in bidding groups proposing to
buy out the company's stockholders and finance operations principally
through debt. But company law in Britain and Australia limits the de-
fensive use of leveraged buyout transactions.2" 7 Further, the Williams
Act in the United States may, on balance, encourage more bidding con-
tests than would otherwise occur by granting target shareholders addi-
tional rights to withdraw tendered shares when a competing bid is made.
Thus, the basic legal framework in the United States may make contested
bids more likely. Although this likelihood does not mean that more
targets will ultimately remain independent, it does reduce the initial hos-
tile bidder's chance for success. Correspondingly, however, the likeli-
hood of contested bids may also increase the premium received on
average by target shareholders. To be sure, factors other than the rules
applicable to takeover transactions also affect whether competing bids
will be made. These factors include the number of prospective bidders
who are active in any given market and their ability to obtain financing
for takeover transactions.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 161-62.
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B. Partial Bids
Another difference among the transactional climates discussed in this
Article that can be partly attributed to differences among rules is the
prevalence of partial bids in one country (Australia) and their striking
paucity in another (Britain). As noted above,2"' the City Code in Britain
has rules that make partial bids unattractive. Further, the Code requires
consent of the Take-Over Panel for such bids. None of the other jurisdic-
tions regulates partial bids so exactingly as to discourage them. This fact
explains the relative infrequency with which such bids are made in
Britain.
The relative popularity of such bids in Australia is more resistant to
explanation in terms of divergent rules, for the rules applicable to partial
bids in the United States are not so different from those in Australia as to
explain why many more bids in Australia are partial offers. One possible
explanation is simply the demographic differences between the two coun-
tries. Australia, despite its vast land mass, has less than one-tenth the
population of the United States20 9 and, correspondingly, much smaller
financial markets. Australia also has a few individuals who, through
complex holding company structures, own controlling interests in hun-
dreds of Australian companies but do not necessarily own all the shares
of those companies.2 0 In short, the prevalence of the partial bid in Aus-
tralia may be explained by the activity of a relatively small number of
208. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
209. The current population of Australia is reported to be 15,543,600. 1986 INFORMATION
PLEASE ALMANAC 151.
210. For example, the defendant in N.C.S.C. v. Industrial Equity Ltd. is reported to have direct
or indirect control over "some hundreds" of companies. After obtaining a substantial interest in a
target through a subsidiary, it negotiates for a seat on the board of directors to gain information so
that it may determine whether a takeover bid for more shares would be advisable. See (1982)
A.C.L.C. 35, 38 (Sup. Ct. N.S.W. 1981). The New Zealand Securities Commission, in a review of
the law and practice concerning corporate takeovers, studied a takeover bid for Bing Harris & Co.
Limited made by Brierly Investments Limited. Brierly Investments is an eponymous corporate vehi-
cle of Ronald A. Brierly, who also as it happens is the chairman of Industrial Equity Limited.
Following the purchase of 20% of Bing Harris's shares by Brierly Investments, a Brierly nominee
was appointed to the Bing Harris board, and subsequently in his capacity as a director became
intimately familiar with its affairs. Two years after the nominee director's appointment, Brierly
Investments announced its intention to make a takeover bid for Bing Harris, and to make it prior to
the scheduled directors' meeting at which Bing Harris's half-year financial results would be consid-
ered. These results were, however, known to the bidder at the time it announced the bid, which was
well in advance of any public disclosure. During the four months preceding its announcement of the
bid, Brierly Investments purchased additional Bing Harris shares, raising its ownership to 33%. See
Securities Commission, 2 Company Takeovers: A Review of the Law and Practice 3-7 (1983).
This sequence of events calls into question, among other things, the propriety of a substantial
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/3
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active bidders who seek to diversify their holding companies' "portfo-
lios" by making partial bids for more targets rather than any-and-all
share bids for fewer targets.
C. Defensive Transactions
The jurisdictions discussed in this Article also differ significantly in the
role that can be played by target management in contesting a hostile
takeover bid. In the United States and Canada, fewer constraints are
placed on management by the rules specifically regulating takeovers. In
both systems, the propriety of management's action is tested by fiduciary
standards, and considerable leeway is available to management.
Although recent cases have reduced management's prerogatives under
some circumstances in the United States, in both countries the cases re-
gard management as properly playing an aggressive defensive role on be-
half of the target and its shareholders, and in both countries many types
of defensive transactions are available towards that end.
shareholder's access to and use of non-public information, received through the conduit of its nomi-
nee director. The Securities Commission concluded that
it is improper for a shareholder, who has obtained from a director of a company informa-
tion about the company's affairs that is relevant to the market price of securities issued by
the company, to buy or sell such securities while the market does not have access to that
information. Moreover, a director acts improperly who passes such information with
knowledge that the recipient is buying or selling, or intends to buy or sell, the securities.
Id. at 28. It is noteworthy that New Zealand has no statutory treatment of insider dealings in shares.
Its Court of Appeal has, however, recognized circumstances in which trading on the basis of non-
public information may be a breach of fiduciary duty. See Coleman v. Myers, [1977] 2 N.Z. L.R.
298.
In Australia, § 229(3) of the Companies Code prohibits present or former corporate officers, direc-
tors and employees from making "improper use" of information acquired by virtue of their positions
with the company to gain an advantage for themselves or for any other person or to cause detriment
to the company. Further, § 128 of the Securities Industry Code prohibits dealings in the securities of
a corporation on the basis of information that is not generally available, by persons "connected" to
the corporation in such a way as to put them in possession of such information. A person is "con-
nected" to the corporation for these purposes if he 1) is an officer or director of the corporation, or
2) is a substantial shareholder (within the Companies Code definition) of the corporation, or 3) occu-
pies a position giving access to non-public information as a result of a professional or business rela-
tionship with the corporation or service as an officer of a substantial shareholder. Id. § 128(8). A
"substantial shareholder" of a corporation under § 136 of the Companies Code is a person who is
entitled to vote 10% of any class of the corporation's voting shares. The prohibition on share deal-
ings on the basis of non-public information would thus appear to reach a "substantial shareholder,"
once voting rights as to 10% of a corporation's shares have been acquired, because the person is then
"connected" to the corporation for purposes of § 128. Many questions remain, however. Does
"dealing in securities" encompass making a takeover bid? And is the nominee director making
"improper use" of the non-public information merely by transmitting it to someone who may trade
on it or may make a takeover bid for the company?
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Management's defensive role is more modest in Britain and Australia.
In Britain, the City Code requires that shareholders vote to approve de-
fensive transactions when a takeover bid is outstanding or when such a
bid appears to be likely. Target management may, however, attempt to
persuade shareholders not to tender and may attempt to lay defensive
fortifications in advance of a bid. Target management is similarly con-
strained in Australia by organic company law and by judicial interpreta-
tions of managers' fiduciary obligations. CASA requires target
shareholder approval for defensive share allotments of twenty percent
more. Further, the defensive buy out transaction is not available in Aus-
tralia.211 Finally, in both countries the basic norm of company law that
directors are removable without cause by majority vote of the sharehold-
ers further limits target management's defensive options.
D. Post-Bid Transactions
The jurisdictions' rules also differ in the limits placed on transactions
in the wake of a successful takeover bid. In Britain, and under some
circumstances in Ontario, once a defined threshold of share ownership is
attained, the person acquiring those shares must offer to buy out the
other shareholders on comparable terms. Thus, acquiring effective con-
trol under these rules entails an obligation to offer to buy all shares,
thereby increasing the cost of acquiring effective control. In contrast, in
the United States and Australia, an offeror who obtains effective control
is under no obligation to offer to buy out the remaining shareholders.
Indeed, the United States permits a cash bid for a legal majority of the
target's shares to be followed by a merger transaction in which the re-
maining shareholders receive different (non-cash) consideration, subject
only to an appraisal remedy provided by state law. On the other hand,
nothing in the United States would prohibit a corporation's shareholders
and directors from adopting charter amendments to require equal treat-
ment of shareholders in the event of a shift in effective control.
VI. CONCLUSION
The comparative analysis of institutions and legal rules in this Article
illustrates two basic points about corporate takeovers: first, whether hos-
tile takeovers occur in any system depends on patterns of share owner-
ship, control and voting. These can readily be manipulated to preclude
211. See supra Section III.D.
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hostile bids. Second, the countries in which hostile bids occur with fre-
quency differ greatly in the constraints imposed on bidders and on man-
agements of target firms. Indeed, takeover regulation in each of these
countries seems to strike a different balance between the strategic posi-
tions of hostile bidders and target management. The United States regu-
lates bidders with a markedly lighter hand than do the other three
countries. Bidders are not required to make a general all-holders bid if
any particular level of share ownership is sought, nor are they required to
make follow-up offers to non-controlling shareholders after a trigger
point of share ownership is passed. Partial bids are not especially dis-
couraged by regulation, and bidders may freely condition their offers.
Under these rules, a person may acquire effective control of a corporation
without being put to the cost of acquiring non-controlling shares at a
price equivalent to that paid for the shares conferring control. But target
management enjoys considerable strategic flexibility as well. Organic
corporate law in the United States does not preclude such transactions as
defensive share repurchases, selective issuer tender offers and leveraged
management buyouts. The protective reach of the "business judgment"
approach is still extensive, although some recent cases have declined to
indulge defensive lock-up transactions in which target management's
preference for one bidder over another is vulnerable to attack as self-
interested or insufficiently considered.2" 2
In Britain, the rules of the Take-Over Panel make acquisition of effec-
tive control a more expensive proposition for the acquiring party, who
must offer to buy out the target's remaining shareholders once the thirty
percent threshold is passed. Partial bids are specifically discouraged, es-
pecially those that would give the bidder effective control of the target.
The bidder's ability to condition the bid is limited by regulation. Target
management, on the other hand, is significantly more inhibited than in
the United States in its ability to defend aggressively against hostile bids.
The City Code requires target shareholders' approval for defensive meas-
ures that could terminate the bid, and statutory company law limits the
target's ability to use defensive share repurchases and lend financial
assistance to preferred bidding groups. The City Code's restrictions on
212. Even in the absence of a lock-up, a management-sponsored transaction may be vulnerable if
it is structured to give shareholders no effective choice between it and a contending third-party offer.
See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 113-14 (Del. Ch. 1986)
(applying Unocal test, court enjoined coercive issuer tender offer purportedly adopted to give share-
holders an alternative to third-party offer).
1987]
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target management are consistent with judicial interpretations in Britain
of management's fiduciary duties. These interpretations historically have
recognized in shareholders a right, external to the directors' powers over
the company, to assemble majority positions.
Target managers in Canada are in a position quite close to that of their
counterparts south of the United States border. Organic corporate law
enables managers to deploy a wide range of defensive transactions, while
their use is tested by a standard that gives primacy to the directors' busi-
ness motivations. The use of defensive share issuances, however, appears
to be more inhibited in Canada due to the TSE's reservation of power to
consider whether any such transaction should be tested by a plebiscite of
the issuing company's shareholders. The costs associated with acquiring
control of a Canadian company vary depending on the provincial regula-
tion applicable to the transaction. Under the Ontario statute, acquisi-
tions over a twenty percent threshold must be made through an all-
holders bid, and exempt private acquisitions of twenty percent blocks
must be followed by an offer to buy out the other shareholders.
Although partial bids are permitted, the bidder's ability to condition any
offer is limited to types of conditions specified in the statute.
In Australia, bidders may make partial offers but as in Ontario, acqui-
sitions over a twenty percent threshold must be structured through an
all-holders bid. The offeror's use of conditioning language in its bid is
regulated by statute only if it seeks to make on-market purchases during
the offer, in contrast to the regulation of conditions in Ontario and Brit-
ain. On the other hand, target management appears to have fewer defen-
sive resources available to it than in the other three systems. Although
the judicial response to defensive transactions appears to have mellowed
in recent years, organic company law prohibits share repurchases and
subjects the lending of financial assistance for the purchase of a com-
pany's shares to a shareholder plebiscite.
Is one of these systems clearly preferable from the standpoint of share-
holders' interests generally? On this point it is helpful to keep in mind
that the two systems that make the acquisition of control most costly for
the acquiring person, Britain and Ontario, like the other systems have
seen high levels of acquisition activity in recent years. This makes prob-
lematic the argument that shareholders as a group are invariably better
off with rules that, by permitting bidders to minimize their costs, en-
courage more rather than fewer bids. The consequences of target man-
agement's differing role in these systems is difficult to assess. One
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possibility, suggested by the United States and Canada, is that manage-
ment's more aggressive defense leads, in many instances, to higher premi-
ums to target shareholders, if management can ease the path of bidders
willing to offer more. But this is not the outcome in all instances. In
many instances management's motivations seem sufficiently in doubt that
a closer regulation of management's defensive capabilities is attractive.
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